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Abstract 
South Africa has been experiencing steady economic growth since 1994, but is 
increasingly battling with development issues such as persisting poverty and growing 
socio-economic inequality. This apparent contradiction is part of the complex South 
African development landscape in which development aid has gradually shifted from 
being transitional to a stable factor in development processes. Possible limitations and 
potential of development aid are set out by the dominating schools of thought; 
mainstream, neoliberal, and radical left. The main aim of this thesis was to evaluate if 
and how development aid contributes to poverty alleviation in South Africa according 
to the theoretical and historical arguments of these schools of thought. 
To evaluate these arguments, I used a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative sources. A literature and policy review was used to identify social, 
political and economic conditions of global trends in development thinking and their 
respective pitfalls, and to identify how trends in South African development aid 
approaches changed after 1994. Quantitative data such as the Aid Dependency Ratio, 
Gini coefficient, and GPD trends, were collected from metadata sources such as the 
OEeD, and the World Bank to evaluate how these indices changed over time. 
During apartheid, development aid to South Africa was channelled through 
anti-apartheid organisations. Since 1994, however, foreign development aid has been 
redirected to South Africa's new government to secure the transition to democracy. 
Since then the government has played a central, dominant role in the allocation of 
development aid to poverty relief programmes, but has prioritised economic 
stabilisation. 
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The South African government presently has capacity problems to spend its 
current development budget. An indiscriminate increase of development aid would 
worsen this problem. In addition this could harm South Africa's monetary stability, 
create aid dependency in certain sectors, and is unlikely to reach the poor due to an 
inadequate institutional framework, while an abandonment of development aid would 
threaten the NGO sector. However, better-focussed or redirected development aid 
resources could indeed contribute to capacity building of government institutions or 
secure the independence ofNGOs. 
11 
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Chapter 1 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1. Background 
In spite of its growing economy and the government's efforts to redistribute 
resources, South Africa is still experiencing growing inequality in wealth and income 
distribution (Hoogeveen & OzIer 2005). Growing civil unrest amongst the poorest 
classes of the South African population suggests that development is not reaching its 
entire people adequately (Kanbur et al. 1999:73). Development aid in the form of 
foreign currency grants has often been suggested as a possible solution to counteract 
such persisting poverty (Arnold 1979). In fact, many socio-economic Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in South Africa justify their existence on this 
principle (Budlender & Dube 1999:345). 
After the 1994 pivotal elections development aid redefined its appearance in 
South Africa (Hearn 2000; Ngeleza et al. 2000). Instead of opposing apartheid 
policies by aiding civil society organisations, donor focus shifted towards supporting 
the new government through short-lived, transitional aid in order to facilitate and 
secure the establishment of a democratic and equal society. However, this short-term 
transitional aid often turned into long-term development aid because of persisting and 
increasing complexities in the South African development landscape (Ngeleza et al. 
2000:35). 
In the mid-1990s the South African development landscape consisted of a 
complex web of internal and external facets. Internally, the country suffered from 
deep socio-economic divisions, hardly any change in the relation of power and control 
(Alexander 2002: 146), institutional capacity problems, skill shortages (Luiz 
1996: 148), and setbacks in the economy (Elbadawi & Hartzenberg 2000:3). 
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Externally, South Africa had to deal with protectionist trade partners in a harsh 
international environment (Venter 1994: 10). Early political uncertainty, prolonged 
periods of droughts (Elbadawi & Hartzenberg 2000:3), persisting high unemployment 
(Alexander 2002: 148), increasing crime rates, and a rapidly increasing HIV -related 
public health crisis have hampered post-apartheid socio-economic development since 
(Terreblanche 2002:42-44). 
African politicians have criticised present development aid as minimal, and 
have called for more and better targeted aid, including to South Africa (Bond 2001:80) 
(Manuel 2003: 19). However, theorists have questioned if the current South African 
economic-ideological framework in which development aid operates is appropriate 
and adequately addresses the full complexity of local development issues 
(Terreblanche 2006; Bond 2001). 
This study seeks to investigate the manner in which an increase in 
development aid could contribute to the struggle against poverty in South Africa. 
More specifically, I will explore the potential implications of a doubling of 
development aid in the light of past experiences within South Africa's economic and 
development framework. Since there is no consensus on the mechanism of 
development aid, I will first elaborate on the wider theoretical debate and history of 
development aid before quantifying the present contribution of development aid to the 
socio-economic development of South Africa. The final part of this thesis will discuss 
the South African development situation and will elaborate on the potential effects of 
development aid on the social and economic dynamics of South Africa. 
2. Debate on development aid 
Most of the aid-receiving countries today, in particular those located on the 
African continent, are relatively poorer than they were in the 1960s despite large 
2 
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financial investments by donor countries (Collier 2006: 188; Morrissey 2006:78). This 
apparent contradiction has led to a vigorous debate among a wide spectrum of 
development theorists on the impact of development aid on poverty alleviation (see, 
e.g., Jayasuriya 2006). This debate should, therefore, be taken into consideration 
when studying this role of development aid in South Africa. However, a 
comprehensive review of all views and opinions on the effectiveness of development 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis. I will therefore limit myself to the three 
most distinct and common schools of thought following Szirmai (2005:609-610): (i) 
the mainstream view, (ii) the neoliberal right view, and (iii) the radical left view. The 
meaning of concepts such as 'right', 'left' and 'mainstream' are context dependent 
and vary slightly across space and time (Therien 2002:448). The distinction made 
here refers to a wide spectrum of attitudes rather than to a mere dyad (Therien 
2002:448). To gain a better understanding of the arguments against or in favour of 
development aid I first categorised the selected theorists into the subsequent 
fundamental mainstream VIews and then compared the theorists' theoretical 
differences within each category. Even if theorists fully agree on the fundamental 
theoretical framework, they can still strongly disagree on the argumentation or 
reasoning of fellow scholars. 
For the comparison of the variations within a school of thought I selected two 
of the most prominent and distinct theorists within each school of thought to 
exemplify the differences and the diversity within each school. The advantage of this 
approach is that it that subsequent arguments can be analysed in depth, illustrating the 
thoughts and backgrounds of the different positions within each school of thought. 
The downside of this approach, however, is that only a limited number of theorists 
can be discussed. Since my aim was to create a representative picture of the main 
3 
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three thoughts, I selected theorists based on their influence on other scholars, on their 
innovative thinking, and on their holistic view on global development issues. 
In addition the identification and understanding the principal differences of 
these schools of thought is a prerequisite to evaluate the different arguments in the 
current development aid debate and will be important guiding principles for this study. 
2.1 Mainstream view 
The mainstream view represents the current prevailing attitude among donor 
countries, governments in aid-receiving countries, officials in national, international 
development organisations, or development bureaucracies, aid workers, and young 
idealist intellectuals (Szirmai 2005:609-610). Irrespective of the poor results of 
development aid in Africa, this view considers development aid as part of a 
sustainable solution to the socio-economic problems of developing countries. 
Numerous reports and books discuss how mainstream theorist and organisations see a 
role for aid in development processes. This section, as already suggested, will look at 
two theorists: Jeffery Sachs, the former World Bank director, and Jan Pronk, Chair in 
the Theory and Practice of International Development at the Institute of Social Studies. 
(i) Sachs approach to end poverty 
In his book The End of Poverty (2005b), Jeffery Sachs presents a detailed plan 
to successfully end poverty globally within two decades that has strong similarities 
with Rostow's classic stages of growth (Rostow 1953). He metaphorically speaks of 
climbing the "ladder of development" (Sachs 2005b:73). With every rung, countries 
benefit from improved dynamics of self-sustainable growth. However, trapped 
countries cannot "get their foot on the ladder" and therefore will not benefit from the 
dynamism of self-sustaining economic growth (Sachs 2005b:73). The poverty trap 
4 
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idea is central in Sachs' development approach; countries trapped in a vicious circle 
of poverty, unable to self-generate adequate investment. If domestic savings alone are 
too little to finance investments one can speak of a financing gap. Additional 
development aid can fill this gap. 
Sachs identifies eight major categories of problems that can trap countries in a 
vicious circle of economic stagnation and decline. Firstly, the problem of the poverty 
trap; when no sufficient income is generated for investment. Secondly, the physical 
geography of a country can hamper development. Some countries just have to invest 
more in infrastructure than others, e.g., landlocked countries. Thirdly, there can be a 
fiscal trap. The population can be impoverished to such an extent that there are no 
taxes to collect, or the government is incapable or too corrupt to collect taxes 
effectively. In other cases a country can be plagued by a pressing debt from the past, 
which frustrates future growth. Other problem categories are governance failures, lack 
of innovation, and trade barriers or subsidies in the world market. Furthermore, the 
cultural environment of a developing country can work as an obstacle to development, 
e.g., social norms can prevent women from accessing education. Lastly, a country can 
be trapped demographically. This occurs when its population is growing faster than its 
capital. 
Amongst suggestions such as debt cancelling, Sachs advocates for an increase 
of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to USD 60 per person per year 1 • 
Development aid can act as a source of investment and enable poor countries to 
increase the growth of their economies and to experience social development. An 
increased Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will on its tum create greater tax income 
1 The average flow of 2000 - 2004 was around USD 15 per person per year (McCawley 2006:89) 
5 
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and increase government revenues. Ultimately, the self-generated mcome through 
taxes should take over the task of development aid. 
(ii) Pronk's catalyst idea 
Jan Pronk is an expert in development Issues after years of working as 
Minister of Development Co-operation in the Dutch government (1973-1977 and 
1989-1998), and as Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United 
Nations (UN) to Sudan (2004-2006). 
In a recent publication Aid as a Catalyst (2004) Pronk specifically engages 
with the role of development aid as catalyser of development. Building on the catalyst 
idea of Rosenstein-Rodan (1961), Pronk supports the idea that development aid 
should be applied to help creating domestic capacity or to manage conflicts by 
generating other resources such as domestic savings, international private capital, 
foreign markets, or skills and capacity. The essence of this approach is that 
development aid is no longer regarded as the primary mover of development 
processes but rather as a facilitator. 
Pronk's position on development aid as a catalyst is based on two principals. 
First, a substitution effect can occur when development aid substitutes domestic 
savings. Subsequently, the emergence of an entrepreneurial class or institutional 
reforms may possibly be frustrated in the short term. In the long run, however, these 
effects will be outweighted by catalysing effects such as opening up of new 
opportunities and enhancing efficiency of production. Secondly, Pronk argues that it 
is likely that development aid will stimulate processes of development but that 
development aid is no guarantee for economic growth. Although Pronk acknowledges 
that no proof exists of a casual positive effect of development aid on economic growth, 
he does not regard this absence of proof as proof of absence. 
6 
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In addition to investment in growth, other resources such as an improvement 
of health care or land redistribution can also make considerable contributions to the 
well-being of the poor. Parallel and subsequent investments in social sectors should 
therefore be made to ensure that the poor will benefit from a trickle down effect from 
investments. 
Pronk regards improving the living standard of the poor as a vital aspect of 
successful development aid. He incites for "good aid", demand-driven grants that are 
adapted to country-specific capacity and culture (2004: 10). Pronk rejects donor-set 
preconditions for development aid such as good governance2, as development aid can 
also be applied as a means to improve local governance by facilitating political 
stability and peace. Pronk's good aid, therefore, should contribute to the establishment 
or re-establishment of social, economical and political conditions under which 
sustainable development can be achieved. 
(iii) Similarity & d!fference 
The view shared among mainstream theorists, such as Sachs and Pronk, is that 
development aid can have a positive effect on development. However, there are 
differences between these mainstream theorists in the understanding of development 
processes and on the role of development aid therein. Sachs, for example, argues that 
there is a direct relationship between development aid and economic growth. Pronk, 
on the other hand, argues that development aid in one form or another can help to 
meet development objectives and indirectly contribute to economic growth. Be that as 
it may, both advocate the general standpoint of increasing development aid. 
2 Donor asses the country's good governance by measuring bureaucratic competence, rule of law, and 
levels of corruption (Brautigam 2000:35). 
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2.2 Neoliberal view 
Neoliberalism refers to a structure of beliefs that is founded on notions of 
individual freedom, political democracy, self-regulated markets and entrepreneurship 
(Peet 2003:8). Neoliberal theorists reject the mainstream idea that development aid is 
an effective tool to eradicate poverty. In their view development aid and government 
interference disrupts the economic processes. 
The main characteristics for neoliberal development thinking is that it seeks 
the solution to poverty alleviation in laissez-faire economics3 and in a reduction of the 
state's role as a "night-watchman" (Chang 2003:47). Especially during the mid-1980s 
and 1990s, this neoliberal approach to development has been highly influential on 
development strategies (Peet 2003: 13). To gain a better understanding of neoliberal 
criticism on the international aid system, I selected two neoliberal theorists who have 
engaged in research on development aid: Melvyn Krauss and William Easterly. 
(i) Krauss' perspective 011 development failure 
In his book Development without Aid (1983), Melvyn Krauss identifies and 
discusses what he regards as the main cause for the development failures in 
developing countries: the Western social-democratic ideology. Krauss' development 
thinking has been influenced by three main factors: (i) his stay at the London School 
of Economics where he worked with various neoliberal thinkers4, (ii) his residence in 
different European welfare states where he became familiar with the socio-economic 
ideology of these states, and (iii) his time at the Hoover Institution at Stanford 
3 The principal of these laissez-faire economics is based on the assumption that the market is the best 
way to initiative growth through a self-sustaining balance between supply and demand (Chataway et al. 
2000:479). Markets are expected to generate prices that balance the supplies and demands for each 
commodity under the conditions of perfect competition (Peet 2003:5). 
4 For example Peter Bauer. Bauer did not accept the mainstream ideas on development policies and 
development aid (Bauer 1971). 
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University during which he collaborated as a visiting scholar with Milton Friedman5 
and where he published his 1983 book. 
Krauss regards development aid as an impendent to economic growth in two 
ways. On the one hand, development aid causes an over-appreciation of the 
recipients' currency. This causes exports to be more expensive than imports, which is 
harmful to local competitive sectors. On the other hand, development aid permits 
developing countries to pursue policies that damage economic growth. Krauss 
identifies three of such damaging policies that are central to the social-democratic 
ideology. 
The first social-democratic policy that Krauss identifies as damaging is the 
provision of extra money to a development government's budget through an increase 
of local taxations, a supply-side development finance. He argues that this is a trick to 
create more spending-money for the local governments, hampering the overall growth 
of developing countries. High taxation subsequently deters people from putting more 
effort into working as they would see more of their money flowing away to the 
government, resulting in lower incomes and fewer savings. 
Secondly, Krauss regards protectionism as a social-democratic idea that 
damages development. In developed countries protectionism prevents the bankruptcy 
of ailing firms, industries and regions by restraining international competition. In 
developing countries protectionism shields infant industries from the world market, 
preventing them from becoming self-sustainable and developing fully to be as 
competitive as the established international counterparts. 
Finally, Krauss regards the securing of certain economIC rights such as 
workers' rights as having catastrophic economic implications. In developed countries 
5 Milton Friedman was a part of the second generation ofneoliberalists (Peet 2002:9) 
9 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
Chapter 1 
certain non-viable sectors are government-supported to prevent large-scale dismissals. 
Developing countries, however, will not develop the necessary market force to 
compete on the world market when such economic rights are adopted here too and 
will miss out on the opportunity of becoming a cheaper alternative to expensive 
Western labour. 
Krauss argues that the world economy should operate on a free market basis 
by removing social-democratic policy obstacles and by minimising government 
interference. This would encourage further development and progress especially in 
developing countries. Krauss explains this principle with an illustrative example: it is 
the size of the pie that you want to make larger so that everybody gets a bigger piece, 
rather than cut the smaller-sized pie into more equal pieces (1983: 190). 
Krauss concludes that the focus of development strategies should be on 
accelerating growth, and not on promoting equity as this will be a spin-off effect of 
economic growth. Key features that facilitate prosperity are multinational 
corporations, free-floating exchange rates, and a greater private sector participation 
rather than protection, development aid, and high taxes through government 
involvement. In this model economic growth will help the poor by increasing the 
living-standard of both rich and poor, rather than redistributing the limited available 
wealth of a country. 
(ii) Easterly's tragedy of aid 
William Easterly is a professor in Economics at the New York University and 
has worked at the World Bank (1985 - 2001) for more than fifteen years. Easterly has 
written extensively on development aid and the international aid system but is mostly 
renowned for his work on the weaknesses of the financing gap model (Easterly 1999). 
10 
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In Easterly's latest book on development aid 171e White Mall's Burdell: why 
the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill alld so little good (2006) he 
gives a full account of his views on the "tragedy of aid" and why more than USD 2.3 
trillion of development aid over fifty years have brought meagre returns (Easterly 
2006:4). To explain the origin of this tragedy, he distinguishes between two 
development approaches: (i) the Planner approach as the equivalent of mainstream 
Western development assistance, and (ii) the Searcher approach as the equivalent of 
agents for change in Easterly's alternative approach. 
The main distinguishing feature between Planners and Searchers is a 
difference in supply or demand thinking. The Planners approach is to determine what 
the developing country needs and to impose development planning upon developing 
countries, without taking local demand into account. This is in contrast to the 
Searchers, who determine the demand first to anticipate on the local consumers 
through market-based interventions. Easterly's Searchers have a far broader base 
among the people in development countries than the Planners. The approach of the 
Searchers, therefore, provides a better and more constructive foundation to 
development aid. To alleviate global poverty the West should stop imposing global 
blueprints for development and let the poor help themselves. 
Easterly argues for a stronger emphasis on "home-grown development" as 
only insiders have the necessary knowledge to find solutions fitted to local problems 
(Easterly 2006:6). A quotation from a recent publication in Wall Street Journal 
reflects fully Easterly's idea on eradicating poverty: "the free market is no overnight 
panacea; it is just the gradual engine that ends poverty" (Easterly 2007: 11). However, 
he does acknowledge that free-market solutions cannot be applied to each and every 
case. 
11 
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Easterly acknowledges that the poorest people do not have the resources to 
motivate markets in meeting their desperate needs. In other words markets are not 
interested in these people as investing in poor people's needs is not profitable. Here, 
development aid projects should be inventive and not apply blueprint-plans as has 
been done in the past. The financing of development projects, he concludes, should 
work like a market mechanism: projects are remunerated according to their success 
rates. 
(iii) Similarity & d~fJereT1ce 
The neoliberal consensus is that the market is the single most important factor 
for sustainable growth and development, and that development aid is an impediment 
rather than an instrument to achieve this. However, there are important differences 
between neoliberals in the role that development aid should have in local development 
processes. Krauss, for example, advocates a total abolishment of the aid system and is 
convinced of the success of a free-market system while Easterly takes a less rigid 
standpoint, acknowledging that in some instances short-term aid is needed to help the 
poorest ofthe poor. 
2.3 Radical left 
The radical left refers to a school of thought that is highly critical of capitalism, 
favours socialism, and often employs a Marxian analysis (Griffin & Gurley 
1985: 1 089). In sharp contrast to the mainstream and neoliberal view, radical left 
theorists consider development aid as a burden, creating dependency and upholding 
underdevelopment rather than as a means to alleviate poverty. Because of major 
development failures in the 1970s, most left-wing critiques on the effectiveness of 
development aid have their origin in this period (Szirmai 2005:611). There is not 
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enough space in this study to discuss all radical left theorists. Therefore, I limited 
myself to a representative northern and a southern hemisphere perspective. 
(i) A northern perspective by Hayter 
Hayter's previous employer was the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 
London, an institution following the mainstream view on development aid. As a result 
of her work, Hayter became increasingly critical of the mainstream view and decided 
to cluster her critique in the book Aid as Imperialism (1971). Hayter's book title is 
provocative and leaves no doubt about the take-home message that development aid 
upholds the control of powerful nations over others. Her book is predominantly based 
on her interest and experience in Latin America. She argues, however, that her 
analysis of development issues is applicable to the rest of the periphery. 
Hayter attributes the failure of development aid to aid receiving governments 
having to adopt policies constructed by donor agencies or countries. She regards 
development aid as leverage to impose economic policies targeted at financial and 
monetary issues, in particular to achieve fiscal and monetary stabilisation. The 
implementation of such imposed policies, however, results in low or negative rates of 
per capita growth. Hayter argues that development aid is used by developed countries 
as a means to maintain a position of control and influence over developing countries. 
Therefore, Hayter concludes, development aid is a modem form of imperialism. 
Hayter proposes two alternative paths to achieve development of the poor: 
through structural reforms or revolution. The first alternative implies gradual 
simultaneous reforms to positively affect growth, resulting in a gradual redistribution 
of income and less inflation. However, Hayter notes that classical reformist 
governments such as Chile and Colombia have not been particularly successful. The 
alternative is the creation of a socialist state through a revolution, e.g., Cuba. 
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Of the two alternatives, Hayter tends towards the socialist state solution. 
Although she has her reservations to proclaim the revolution in Cuba as successful, as 
an overall decline in national product has been observed in this country, she is 
nevertheless impressed by Cuba's small successes such as a relatively low 
unemployment rate. Either way, Hayter sees no room for development aid to alleviate 
poverty because it obstructs local development and creates an exploitive relation 
between North and South, serving the interest of the donor only. 
(ii) A southern perspective by Bello 
Walden Bello's ideas take after the theorists Samir Amin (1985) and Karl 
Polanyi (1944). Like Arnin and Polanyi, Bello can be identified as an anti-capitalist 
and an advocate of a radical change of the present capitalist system. Anti-capitalists 
oppose the present capitalist international system as the system maintains powerful 
monopolistic structures. These monopolies are thought to exploit people and countries 
for their own benefit (Bond 2004:833-834). 
In his report Prospects for Good Global Governance: the ViewFo111 the South 
(2002) Bello criticises the current global system and proposes an alternative model of 
a decentralized, pluralistic system of global economic governance. The United States 
(US) Treasury's influence on the World Bank6 and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) is so dominant that these institutes primarily cater for the interest of the US 
economy and international corporations at the cost of developing countries. Bello, 
therefore, regards the current development paradigm and the influential US Treasury 
as the basis for a series of development aid failures. 
6 Although the World Bank group consist of five different structures, in this text World Bank refers 
merely to the two main structures: the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (lBRD) 
and International Development Agency (IDA). 
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The current international system is export-orientated, a major obstacle for 
developing countries according to Bello. The problems identified by Bello are: (i) 
higher risk of becoming dependent on foreign investment and foreign financial 
markets, (ii) little prospect of income and land redistribution, (iii) constant emphasis 
on economic growth and promotion of macroeconomic stability, on legal and political 
conditions in the interests of foreign capital, and on unrestricted functioning of the 
market, (iv) lack of accountability of the private sector, (v) transnational cooperations 
undermining community cooperatives, private enterprises, and state enterprises, and 
(vi) undemocratic formal decision-making systems of the Bretton Woods Institutions. 
Bello states that poverty cannot be solved by just throwing money at it. 
Development aid will only be successful if the present global capitalist system is 
radically changed. Therefore, Bello argues for a break with the current global 
economic system through "deglobalisation", implying a reorientation of current 
economies (Bello 2002:24). 
Bello's deglobalisation entails a shift from predominantly producing for 
export to producing for own local markets and creating financial resources for 
development from within. He applies Polanyi's idea of "re-embedding the economy in 
society, rather than having society driven by the economy" (Bello 2002:24). 
Important in this approach is the establishment of a plural world system where 
interaction between organisations is based on equality. Such framework would allow 
developing countries to pursue a development strategy that is suited to their local 
needs and values, their unique mix of constraints and opportunities, and their rhythms 
as societies (Bello 2002:2). 
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(iii) Similarity & d~fJerellce 
The consensus amongst radical left theorists is that development aid in the 
current world system is not working for developing countries and is beneficial to the 
powerful, developed countries alone. Solutions to resolve this development problem, 
however, differ between these theorists. Bello, for example, advocates a radical break 
with the system by proposing an entirely new plural system in whjch development aid 
plays a positive role. Hayter, in contrast, rejects development aid all together, even in 
a new socialist system. 
2.4 Significance of the debate 
Currently there is a heated debate between theorists on the effects and 
usefulness of development aid but no sign of imminent consensus. Even within the 
three main schools of thought we find disagreements among theorists. The issues that 
are raised by the various theorists (e.g., poverty trap, trickle down effects, catalysing 
effect, free market processes and their effect on development, dependency, and 
deglobalisation) already give a good indication of the wide rage of factors that need to 
be considered when evaluating the possible effects of development aid in South 
Africa. 
As pointed out by Pronk, there is no proof of a causal positive relationship 
between development aid and economic growth. However, this does not mean that 
development aid cannot have a positive, catalytic effect on economic development. 
Moreover, economic growth is an inscrutable process, more dependent on complex 
dynamics of specific time and places than the aid industry initially assumed (Sogge 
2002: 174). By considering history, theory, and practice, one can learn from past 
mistakes and take these into consideration when drafting future policy on the function 
of development aid for poverty alleviation. 
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3. Concept of development aid 
Development aid is addressed differently by politicians, development 
organisations, schools of thought, and even between schools of thought. The 
American typology, foreign aid, is often used interchangeably with ODA (e.g., 
Friedman 1985 in Svensson 2000; Easterly 2006). In other parts of the world scholars 
tend to refer to development aid rather foreign aid (e.g., Lensink & White 1999; 
Jayasuriya 2006). Other terms found in the literature are international development 
aid (Zeylstra 1975), development assistance (Manuel 2003), and international aid 
(Easterly et al. 2004). 
In this thesis, I will use the term development aid as a co-operation between 
countries in the form of financial flows with a developmental intention. Development 
aid comes thus per definition from abroad. However, in the course of this thesis, I will 
distinguish between development aid provided to the South African government and 
provided directly to South African civil society. 
Development aid includes project aid and programme aid whereby the former 
refers to a grant or loan provided to a government agency or NGO for a specific 
project or outcome (Hoy 1998:5). Programme aid refers to a policy-based loan to a 
receiving government to create certain economic conditions in the recipient's country, 
or to support balance of payments (Hoy 1998: 5). The concept of development aid 
generally excludes emergency aid, technical assistance, military aid, political support, 
export promotion, or cultural propaganda (Zeylstra 1975: 15). Also private activities 
such as missionary work, industrial investment, external commercial loans, and 
private foreign investment are excluded from this definition (Zeylstra 1975: 15). 
Where ODA is explicitly used in the text, it refers to the definition as set by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (OECD; see 
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Box 1). This aDA can take vanous forms such as financial grants, technical 
assistance or loans. 
Box 1. The definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
aDA consist of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official 
agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each 
transaction of which meets the following two criteria: (i) it is administered with the promotion of 
the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and (ii) it is 
concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a 
rate of discount of 10 percent). 
Source: Riddell (2007:19) 
4. Research design and methodology 
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which development 
aid improves poverty alleviation in South Africa. To answer this question I analysed 
and interpreted a combination of quantitative and qualitative data to evaluate how 
three possible development aid directions would affect future poverty alleviation 
efforts in South Africa. These directions were (i) no change in present development 
aid flows, (ii) a complete abandonment of development aid, and (iii) a doubling of 
development aid. The advantages and disadvantages of each direction are based on 
the ideas of the dominating schools of thought (mainstream, neoliberal, and radical 
left) and on identified pitfalls in past global development aid. 
Since the emerging of the development aid industry after World War II, 
different development aid doctrines have been dominant such as free-market 
fundamentalism or the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). I have 
reconstructed the establishment, successes and failures of the main approaches and 
their respective historical and political backgrounds using a combination of peer-
reviewed journal articles and books. I did background checks of each author and 
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compared interpretations of historical facts with that of other schools of thought to 
ensure a fair balance of opinions. I made use of articles and books that were available 
from South African university libraries, or were available online and had an ISBN or 
DOC number. 
Due to its former apartheid regime, South Africa has been through a historical 
development that is incomparable to any other country in the world. Today the 
aftermath of the apartheid regime is seen in a number of areas. The most striking 
legacy is the vast inequality along racial lines as is still experienced today. It is 
therefore necessary to identify if and how previous development aid has affected the 
present-day South African development aid landscape. 
To study the South African development aid landscape I used the same written 
sources as indicated in the previous sections. In addition, I quantified trends in 
development aid flows using published financial reports such as the National Treasury 
South Africa, African Development Report, United Nations Development Programme: 
South Africa, World Bank, the OECD International Development Statistics dataset, 
and donor policy documents. This OECD dataset is a comprehensive compilation of 
the volume, origin and types of aid and other resource flows to developing countries 
on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) List of ODA recipients between 
1960 and 2005, and is drawn from Member countries responses to questionnaires 
issued by the OECD Secretariat (OECD 2007a). 
To analyse present-day development aid to South Africa, I quantified recent 
ODA flows to South Africa (1993 - 2005) using the OECD data. This time-series of 
ODA data was compared with trends in poverty and inequality measurements such as 
the Gini coefficient, the GDP, and the poorest quartile contribution to the GDP. In 
7 A DOl number is the digital variant of an ISBN number and ensures that these electronic publications 
will remain unchanged and available through the web portal of its publisher 
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addition, I made a qualitative analysis of post-apartheid development aid and the role 
of NGOs therein to assess the development aid dependency of South Africa. 
5. Ethical considerations 
Although this study is entirely based on secondary, readily published data 
sources there are still ethical issues one needs to take into consideration in the 
discussion and conclusion stages (Taylor 1994). Choices of words or conclusions 
drawn in this thesis could be misinterpreted or cited out of context by readers such as 
donors, governments, or other target groups. A change in the current aid system can 
affect interest groups in the South African society differently, depending on their 
social backgrounds. This research aims to be an unbiased, scientific analysis of the 
effects of development aid in the development of South Africa and any conclusions 
drawn from this study must therefore be interpreted using the definitions and literature 
background as laid out in this entire thesis. 
6. Outline 
This essay has five different chapters, including this one. To gain a good 
understanding of the emergence of development aid in development thinking, I 
analyse how the different development aid approaches from the 1950s onwards have 
affected the current approaches in development aid throughout the world in Chapter 2. 
I elaborate on the ideas behind the Marshall Plan and the subsequent aid plans for 
developing countries, development aid in the Cold War period with special attention 
to the Structural Adjustment period, and engage with the function and format of the 
post-Cold War development aid to its current form. 
Past development aid in South Africa is analysed in Chapter 3. To put 
development aid to South Africa in its context, I consider development and military 
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aid during the apartheid era. In addition I examme the shifts and continuities In 
development aid with the change to a democratic government in 1994. 
Chapter 4 is a synthesis of the previous chapters. In this chapter I discuss 
whether an increase or doubling of development aid in the current economic and 
ideological system is the solution to South Africa's poverty issues. 
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Chapter 2. History of development aid 
The current debate in development thinking has been triggered by different 
criticisms on failures of the past development aid approaches. Global trends in 
development approaches necessarily affect development at a national level because of 
the interconnectiveness of the global system (Sachs 2005a: 1 0). Many useful lessons, 
therefore, can be drawn from the global history of aid to designing contemporary 
strategies to advance development aid impacts (United Nations 2006:4). 
This chapter gives an overview of the history of development aid, starting with 
the development aid initiatives that emerged at the end of the 1940s to today's 
development consensus. This will enable me to identifY potential pitfalls for possible 
future development directions in South Africa. I will, therefore, identifY the various 
development approaches since World War II (WWII), their respective successes and 
failures in the political and socio-economic contexts of their time. 
1. Post-WWII development strategy - the Marshall Plan 
The roots of the current international aid system can be traced back to several 
initiatives following the end of WWII (Ali et al. 1999:504). One of the first 
development aid initiatives was the Marshall Plan; a development formula proposed 
by the United States (US) Minister of Foreign Affairs to rebuild post-war Europe. 
This formula is even today supported by a number of theorists, for example by Jeffrey 
Sachs (2005b). The first ten years following the end of WWII were years of 
reconstruction. After two World Wars (1914 - 1918 and 1939 - 1945) there was not 
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much left of Europe's economl. The once flowering European city centres had been 
shot to rubble and infrastructures critically damaged. 
These post-war circumstances raised fear among European and US economists 
and state officials for a repetition of the Great Depression (1929) as a result of the 
high unemployment and inflation rates. Marshall feared that "bottlenecks clogging the 
recovery", especially in the coal industry as the lack of coal, would make it 
impossible for post-war Europe to produce steel and machinery or to generate 
electricity (Kapstein 1984:56). To avoid further economic stagnation and to initiate 
economic growth, a macro-economic approach was launched in 1947 by the US to 
rebuild Western Europe (Kapstein 1984:56). 
The rationale behind this development approach assumed that an "influx of 
capital from outside provides the spurt of growth that would make economic 'take-
off possible" (Ali et al. 1999:505). Over USD 13 billion was allocated to the sixteen 
European nations participating in the Marshall Plan between 1948 and 1951 alone 
(Kapstein 1984:57). Support for industrial development in poor countries would bring 
positive spillovers in terms of trade and investment opportunities and trickle down to 
the poor (United Nations 2006: 11). Continuous economic growth and social stability 
since have transformed these Western Europe countries into welfare states. 
The process of gradually turning into welfare states raised Western social 
awareness of persisting inequalities in the world (Myrdal 1989: 8). The Marshall Plan 
had proven itself as a very successful tool for enhancing economic development into 
globally competing economic powers and within only a few years the US extended 
their Marshall Plan idea to the rest of the world (Edmunds 1968:14). The believe was 
that what is good to rebuild European countries would also be good for peripheral 
8 Europe refers to the war-affected countries in Western Europe. 
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countries. This created a base for the modernistic development thinking that did not 
take differences in culture or history into account, and considered development as 
western modernisation (Szirmai 200S:49S). 
2. Development aid to the "underdeveloped" world 
From the 19S0s onwards, broad development issues such as income 
distribution and poverty alleviation were increasingly placed on the development 
agenda of the US. The 19S0s can be regarded as the decade of US hegemony in 
development aid, as the US alone in that decade accounted for 2/3 of total 
development aid (Hjertholm et al. 1998: 11). The first indication of US development 
concerns beyond their Western European allies was when the US president, Harry S. 
Truman, dedicated his inauguration speech to emphasise the US role to "embark on a 
bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial 
progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas" 
(Truman 1949). 
This sudden expressed concern by the US and other Western development 
institutions for the large number of poor people in the world originated from an 
increase of Cold War related conflicts between the US allied and Soviet allied 
countries (Peet 2003: lIS). During the late 19S0s and early 1960s, therefore, one of 
the US strategies to increase its global political influence was by supporting countries 
through financial, military, or political resources. Firstly the US focussed on 
communist-neighbouring countries to block communism from spreading. Later the 
US extended its focus to developing countries throughout the world, to create a 
stronger US and allies block. Development aid proved to be a convincing tool in 
preventing developing countries from joining the communist block (Hjertholm & 
White 2000: 11-12). In return, Russia and China applied the same politically 
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motivated development strategy, turning the Third World 9 into a hot-spot of 
ideological conflict (Peet 2003: 114). 
In the years after the WWII the majority of development aid resources came 
from the US as the countries in Western Europe were mainly concerned with their 
own reconstruction process (Edmunds 1968: 13). However, some development support 
materialised between the old colonial structures and former colonies. In this early 
period of development aid, the ex-colonial powers were strictly involved in 
developing their former colonies. 
For example, the so-called Colombo Plan, launched by Commonwealth 
countries United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in January 
1950, aimed at providing aid to the countries of the former British India, present-day 
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. This included the establishment of a Consultative 
Committee to provide the necessary framework for adequate international cooperation 
efforts to promote economic and social development to the Asia-Pacific countries and 
to improve the living standards of its peoples (Consultative Committee 2007). 
However, no prior research had been undertaken on the practical implications of 
development theories. Early development aid can therefore be regarded as a massive 
experiment (Chakravarti 2005: 1). 
Similar to the UK, France's post-war development aid was also tightly 
connected with decolonisation and the objectives of their decolonisation policies. In 
the case of the French, the objective of aid was far and foremost strategic-political, 
9 This terminology refers to development countries. 1t finds it origin in Sauvy (1952) "ce Tiers-Monde, 
ignore, exploite, meprise comme Ie Tiers-Etat" referring to Third World non-aligned countries, in 
addition to First World (US allies) and Second World (communist block). Throughout the years, the 
term has been politicised and now regarded as subjective (Rapport & Overing 2000: 18-19). I therefore 
adopt the term developing country. However, in this specific context it contributes to the narrative to 
use these time-related terms. 
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meaning that aid was predominantly used to maintain cultural, economic and political 
strings with Francophone Africa (Szirmai 2005:586). 
Development aid was also increasingly used as a tool to promote or restore a 
country's reputation (Szirmai 2005:586). For example, through large scale 
participation in multilateral assistance the Netherlands sought restoration of its 
international reputation after the international condemned Dutch police actions In 
Indonesia during the Indonesian fight for independence. 
3. Elements ofpost-WWII war development strategies 
The following elements have been prominently present In post-WWII 
development strategies: (i) growth in Gross Domestic Product (GOP), (ii) extensive 
governmental planning, (iiz) intervention, and (iv) a preference for large-scale 
investment (Szirmai 2005:313-314). The political landscape of the 1950s was 
characterised by an influx of new, developing nations (Hjertholm & White 2000: 10). 
The main policy objective of these now independent countries was economic growth, 
as their governments widely supported the idea that social inequalities would be 
eliminated through economic growth and modernisation per se (Thorbecke 2000: 19). 
This idea was similar to that of the Marshall Plan: by providing necessary 
capital, developing countries would accumulate sufficient savings to propel them into 
self-sustained growth (Thorbecke 2000:23). Money that was spent on broader social 
programmes, education, or health was generally regarded as a waste of scarce 
resources (Peet 2003: 114). Development was primarily contextualised by Europe and 
the US and therefore imbued by western traditions. Consequently, monumental 
projects such as building dams, roads, harbours or airports were the norm rather than 
the exception during the first decade ofpost-WWII development aid (Peet 2003:115). 
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Nowhere else but in Europe, however, did the Marshall Plan approach its 
goals of propelling impoverished nations into welfare states. One of the reasons that 
the Marshall Plan worked so well in Europe was that an entire framework for 
development was already in place. The financial influx of US dollars was sufficient to 
"stimulate restoration" of the management personnel, skilled labour, capital 
equipment, industries, functioning factories, existing customs relations, structured 
education systems and legal systems that had already been in place before the war 
started (Edmunds 1968: 15). Developing countries entering the world system had 
totally different economic, social and cultural conditions. 
Early development aid conveniently ignored local circumstances such as 
ethnic structures, populations, manners, behaviours, economic conditions, life style, 
or environmental conditions (Nabudere 2006:34). The assumption of modernistic 
development doctrine was that development would occur in a linear pattern, from 
traditional to modem. In addition, developing countries had no industrialised 
framework to rebuild. Such essentially different development conditions, however, 
were never specifically considered by Western development theorists, policy makers 
or politicians (Szirmai 2005:495). 
Although the ideology of development aid did not change dramatically during 
the 1960s, the way development aid was provided did. There was a general shift from 
project aid to programme aid. By 1955, the World Bank had expressed its concerns 
around project based aid since "experience has shown again and again that 
monumental projects are not necessary useful projects" (in Peet 2003: 115). Although 
most people in poor countries work in the agricultural sector, this sector had thus far 
been largely neglected by Western development aid (Peet 2003: 116). In the course of 
the 1960s the World Bank became more lenient towards programme lending rather 
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than supporting large transportation or electrical power related projects (Peet 
2003: 115). This change in approach led to a widening of sectorial coverage of lending 
and a gradual shift from industrial infrastructure investment towards the agricultural 
investment. 
4. Greater emphasis on Basis Needs 
By the end of the 1960s some major development problems surfaced. Firstly, 
the income distribution within development countries remained skew or had even 
widened. The number of people in a state of poverty, i.e. below the normative 
minimum income level or standard of living, was very large and continued rising 
(Thorbecke 2000:28; Edmunds 1968: 15). Furthermore, large numbers of developing 
countries had to deal with increasing levels of unemployment and urbanisation 
because of their deteriorating economic situation. Moreover, the position of the 
developing world within the world economy had worsened. This was reflected in an 
increased balance-of-payments pressure, rapidly mounting foreign indebtedness, and 
debts servicing burdens (Thorbecke 2000:28). The growth in global poverty and 
inequality was an acute problem, one that could not be ignored by development 
theorists and policymakers. 
In the early 1970s, the concerns to address acute developing problems gave 
rise to the Basic Needs approach, which had a considerable influence on development 
aid at that time (United Nations 2006:84). The goal of this approach was to interlink 
development and human needs by providing a level of subsistence to all so that no 
one starves and all are capable of being productive members of society (Max-Neef 
1991: 16; Spalding 1990:91). In the allocation of financial resources there was now 
increased attention of accessible basic goods and services, rather than only on the 
economic output (Peet 2003: 120). 
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Opposed to the notion that a surplus of the "advanced" industrialised sector 
would spill over onto other sectors, the rural and infom1al 1o sector were now regarded 
as the way through which development could be achieved (Hart 2006: 17). This Basic 
Needs approach regards small-scale forms of production as more efficient to reach the 
poor than large scale industries. In the Basic Needs approach individual choice was 
often subordinated to the greater good (Spalding 1990:91). State regulation In 
productive activities was, therefore, central in the 'basic needs' strategy. 
During the 1970s there was an increase of public investments In projects 
benefiting the poor (Thorbecke 2000:32-33). These poverty alleviation programmes 
were accompanied by massive resource flows (Hart 2006: 17). However, this poverty 
focus only briefly dominated the development agenda, as emergency balance-of-
payments problems pushed Basic Needs from the development agenda (Hjertholm & 
White 2000: 13). Within a few years free market fundamentalism became the 
dominant doctrine in development (Sogge 2002: 173). 
5. The effect of the 1980s debt crisis on aid 
At the end of 1970s the position of multilateral institutions, especially that of 
the World Bank and the IMF, had become increasingly dominant due to a complex of 
factors such as the devaluation of the sterling and the oil crisis (Hjertholm & White 
2000:9). Through this newly acquired power position, the World Bank was leading 
both the policy dialogue and the research agenda (Hjertholm & White 2000: 13). The 
IMF on the other hand had evolved from a "means of collaboration on exchange rates 
and payments mainly under industrialised countries" into a "means for the First World 
to control over the Third World economic policy" (Peet 2003:71). Strictly speaking 
10 The informal sector entails two types of activities; (i) survival activities, such as casual jobs, 
temporary jobs, unpaid jobs, subsistence agriculture, multiple job holding, and (ii) unofficial earning 
strategies such as illegal businesses (World Bank 2007a). 
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the IMF is not a donor. However, its influence stretches far into the donor community 
through their development approaches, strategies and advices (Chakravarti 2005:74). 
The international political climate of the 1980s radically changed development 
aid and its environment due to a global economic stagnation (Thorbecke 2000:33). 
The main critical events of this slowdown in the world's economic growth were (i) 
two great oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979-1980, and (ii) the resulting debt crisis of 
1982 (Mosley et a1. 1991:5). "Petro-dollars" lent by private commercial banks had 
been the principal source of external finance of development countries (Mosley et a1. 
1991:9). However, the lending source dried up overnight leaving developing countries 
in the cold with extremely high debts. Development aid was unable to fill up the 
excessive financing gap that had resulted from these events (Mosley et a1. 1991 :9). 
The economic crisis of the 1980s was the most serious economic setback since 
the depression of 1929, forcing many countries to adjust their economies in order to 
accommodate external shocks. This gave rise to development aid in the form of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) enclosing several market-oriented policies 
with macroeconomic stability at their core (Owusu 2003: 1657). The SAPs, widely 
advocated by the World Bank and other financial institutions, were swiftly adopted by 
donors (Szirmai 2005:565). The message was sent to aid receiving governments 
countries to change their countries towards more export-orientated economies (Peet 
2003 :77). Minimal state regulation along with privatisation, trade liberalisation, and 
limited state budget deficits would assist developing economies to overcome their 
economic setbacks (Peet 2003:77). 
In addition to these SAPs, there was a strong sentiment among donors to 
drastically reduce aid. Because of the global economic stagnation, there was no broad 
political support for development aid any longer. Instead domestic private capital 
30 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 2 
flows of developing countries should pay for development (Thorbecke 2000). Hence, 
development aid during this period shifted towards a "stop-gap measure" for 
economic recovery (Thorbecke 2000:38). 
To be regarded in this period for grants or loans fiscal and economIC 
adjustment policies were imposed as a requirement (Owusu 2003:1658). However, 
these SAPs failed to adequately address social, cultural, and environmental 
development Issues as a result of this conditionality (Peet 2003: 140). In many 
developing countries the SAP policies achieved marginal poverty alleviation and 
certain policies even made life worse for the poor (Lopes 1999:511,514,517). 
6. Post-Cold War development aid 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 initiated the ending of the Cold War. By 
1991, the Soviet Union had dissolved and, after years of being development aid 
donors, the now former Soviet States had turned into net receivers (Hjertholm & 
White 2000: 14). Development aid was no longer needed to ensure political allies as 
was done during the Cold War. The ending of the Cold War can, therefore, be 
regarded as one of the main reasons for the aid fatigue observed in the early 1990s 
(Raffer & Singer 2001 :66). 
6.1 Washington Consensus 
Many theorists refer to the development thinking of the 1990s as the period of 
the Washington Consensus (see, e.g., Hart 2006; Stiglitz 2002), a policy advice 
published by the Washington-based institutions for Latin America (Williamson 
2000:251). In spite of major changes in global politics in the 1990s and the decline in 
development aid resources, the general approach of the Washington Consensus did 
not differ much from the unsuccessful SAPs (Thorbecke 2000:38). Only a few small 
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changes were observed of which the shift from conditional to selective development 
aid was the most prominent. Selective development aid rejects interference by donors 
in choosing development strategies. Instead countries are selected based on a priori 
criteria such as good governance (Szirmai 2005:587; Stiglitz 2002:242). Economic 
development, however, still did not materialised in most of the developing countries. 
Box 2. Washington Consensus 
The main elements of the Washington Consensus: 
• fiscal discipline, 
• a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic 
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, 
primary education, and infrastructure, 
• tax reform by lowering marginal rates and broaden the tax base, 
• interest rate liberalisation, 
• a competitive exchange rate, 
• trade liberalisation, 
• liberalisation of inflows of foreign direct investment, 
• privatisation, 
• deregulation, and 
• secure property rights. 
Source: Williamson (2000:251) 
The continuous failure of many development aid projects led to a questioning 
of the Washington Consensus development approach (e.g., by Stiglitz 2002). It 
became clear that the SAPs in Africa, a typical example of the Washington Consensus 
approach, did not adequately address the structural causes of the continent's crisis. 
The social costs of the SAPs were too high and threatened the long-term development 
of Africa (Owusu 2003: 1659). 
Critiques from the left, supported by a numerous cases of failed neoliberal 
market and fiscal reforms, were eventually picked up by the World Bank and other 
agencies in the late 1990s. Most of today's theorists and donors agree that market-
reform, as emphasised by the Washington Consensus, does not lead to an achievement 
of development aid targets. On the contrary, income inequality tends to increase under 
32 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 2 
aid-driven structural adjustment, especially where an economy is growing and aid 
conditionalities are tough (Sogge 2002: 147). 
6.2 Post-Washington Consensus 
Towards the end of century donor focus started changing towards an emphasis 
on human development rather than economic growth alone (Erixon & Sally 2006:69). 
Donor ideology refocused on basic needs, involving state and civil society during the 
various stages of the development process (Erixon & Sally 2006:69; Hjcrtholm & 
White 2000:9). In practice, this approach allocated a larger role to receiving 
governments to allow anticipating on inefficient externalities of the dynamic market 
forces. For example, when domestic markets fail to address matters of common good 
because of the lack of profitability, e.g., health care in rural areas (Stiglitz 2004:2). 
One of the main critiques on the Washington Consensus came from the former 
Senior Vice-President and Chief Economist of the World Bank (1997 - 2000), Josef 
Stiglitz. He identified the shortcomings of the Washington Consensus such as too 
little understanding of economic structures of developing countries, or a too narrow 
set of objectives and instruments (Stiglitz 2004:2). To improve future development 
rates, Stiglitz suggested tailor-made development reform packages as an alternative, 
and referred to this approach as the post-Washington Consensus. 
Stiglitz' approach was that tailor-made packages should be designed by the 
developing countries themselves, allowing room for the country's own judgement, 
and exploring which development policy suits specific circumstances best. Although 
not all theorists agree with Stiglitz's term ofa post-Washington Consensus (Maxwell 
2007; Sumner 2006), in general this term is now widely accepted to describe the 
current consensus on present-day development aid approaches (Bond 2004:820). 
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6.3 Millennium Development Goals as overarching framework 
The current post-Washington Consensus approach is heavily influenced by the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). These MDGs provide a globally agreed set 
of objectives as a guideline, or framework, aiming to reduce poverty with 50 percent 
by 2015 and to convert other important development issues such as healthcare, gender 
inequality, and environmental issues into action plans. The international community 
joined forces to provide more finance for development through Official Development 
Aid (aDA) (Addison et al. 2005: 113). Many donors and development projects have 
adopted this MDG action plan in their current development policies (Cornwall & 
Brock 2005:1048). 
Currently, development aid is mostly distributed in the form of multilateral aid 
to governments or is targeting specific programmes such as famine, HIV/AIDS, or 
education for all (Maxwell 2007:2). In accordance with the MDGs, the development 
agenda of the World Bank - one of the key multilateral donors - has abandoned its 
reform attitude. The World Bank now uses the MDGs as guidelines by including 
concerns for powerless, voicelessness, and vulnerability, and to address non-economic 
development issues such as a lack of food, shelter, and other basic necessaries. The 
effect of the MDGs on current development is underlined by the fact that some 
theorists now use the MDGs as an over-arching framework to describe the current 
development agenda (see, e.g., Maxwell 2007; United Nations 2006). 
With the current development approach aiming at encouraging development of 
the African region, specific features of the original Marshall Plan of the 1950s are 
reintroduced (United Nations 2006:7). Effective public expenditure management is 
encouraged by emphasising high-quality governance and good policies. The 
previously tolerant attitude of donors towards development recipients has changed 
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drastically and is no longer unconditional. Moreover, donors have started usmg 
development aid as a means to award or penalise countries on the basis of its 
governments' perfonnances (Hjertholm & White 2000: 14). McCawley's metaphor of 
the current international development agenda as a "Christmas Tree" (2006:93) is 
therefore spot on: present development aid exists of a motley selection of tactics that 
have often re-emerged from different development aid periods of the twentieth 
century. 
7. Conclusion 
Global trends in development aid have been affected by different prevailing 
political and socio-economic conditions. The successful Marshall Plan inspired 
subsequent development thinking to allocate vast amounts of resources into large 
scale projects aimed at increasing the GDPs in periphery countries. However, western 
development thinking overlooked local circumstances and different economic, social, 
and cultural conditions. Therefore, a reintroduction of an unadjusted Marshall Plan 
approach was likely to fail. 
The Basic Needs approach of the 1970s comprised of large sums of 
development aid involving intensive donor and government interference. In contrast 
to the Marshall Plan approach, this development approach did take the agricultural 
sector into consideration and focussed on basic needs, like food, shelter, education etc. 
to alleviate poverty. Global economic recession, however, led to an abandonment of 
the costly Basic Needs approach. Instead western countries imposed Structural 
Adjustment Programmes on developing countries to stabilise local economies in the 
1980s. This approach left the poor even worse off than before. In spite of these social 
disadvantages, the Washington Consensus of the 1990s continued this approach, 
advocating an even further liberalisation of global markets. 
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The current Post-Washington Consensus is a selection of past development 
approaches, advocating an integrated tackling of economic and social issues. However, 
key lessons of the Washington Consensus, e.g., that potentially profitable markets 
need to be in place before market liberalisation is successful, are often overlooked. 
This is especially the case for remote, rural areas, where market mechanisms often do 
not follow western-style free-market principles. 
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Chapter 3. Past and present development aid to South Africa 
The apartheid history of South Africa is the single most important factor 
distinguishing this country from other African countries (Aliber 2003:474). Before 
possible future development aid directions in South Africa can be evaluated, the 
framework within which present development aid is allocated needs to be reviewed 
against the development aid history of this country. This history has not only affected 
foreign development aid to South Africa, but to the entire southern African 
subcontinent (Love 1999). 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the historical framework of present 
development aid to South Africa, to evaluate how the role of development aid has 
changed during the apartheid era and after the 1994 elections, and how the South 
African government allocates development aid to poverty alleviation. First, I will 
qualify the roles and motives of development aid to the civil society of South Africa 
during the apartheid era, and how these roles and motives changed since the 1994 
general elections. Subsequently I will quantify the role of development aid since 1994 
by using existing metadata sets on Official Development Aid to South Africa, country 
statistics, and reports from the South Africa government. 
1. Development aid during apartheid 
After World War II (WWII) the United States (US) emerged as a hegemonic 
power in the world. The US was able to expand its power by granting financial loans 
and development aid such as the Marshall Plan. In addition, the coupling of the gold 
price with the dollar enabled the US to dominate the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (Peet 2003:37-39). These institutions operated using a 
carrot-and-stick principle: without IMF membership no admission to the World Bank, 
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and without conformation to the IMF no development aid assistance from the World 
Bank (Padayachee 1987:31). Consequently, the IMF could independently open or 
close development aid and loan possibilities (Padayachee 1987:39). 
In the same post-WWII period, South Africa too was experiencing major 
changes in its political landscape. The National Party (NP) won the general election in 
1948 and institutionalized the apartheid system. This system attempted to promote 
strict separation of races and led to an uneven economical, geographical, and political 
development (Beinart 2001:3). 
1.1 Foreign donors supporting apartheid 
Development aid through government catered for white interests only until the 
1990s (Bond 2001; Swilling & Russell 2002: 11-12). In addition, the government 
attempted to control all development aid flows to South Africa. The Fund Raising Act 
of 1978 criminalised seeking or receiving donations from the public unless this had 
been authorised by the Director of Fundraising from the government (Habib & Taylor 
1999:75). This forced South Africa based anti-apartheid Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) to seek funding resources underground or to cease their 
activities. 
Until 1982, the South African government was able to take out loans from the 
IMF (Padayachee 1987:48). In spite of increasing public pressure and negative advice 
from within the IMF board, the US continued securing its economic interests in South 
Africa by pressuring the IMF to grant loans to South Africa's racial capitalist system 
(Padayachee 1987:45-48). After 1982, however, pressure from the international 
community made it undesirable for the IMF and Western governments to openly 
allocate development aid to the South Africa government (Klotz 1995; Padayachee 
1987). 
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f,'cu ,hiring the mid·1980s, whcn aparthcid was mmpant, counui~s with a 
long,tanding and d •• p-s~aled re ia(innship with South Africa SllCh as the N~therla"d" 
West Gennany, the Cmted Kingdum (l:KI or the CS, bd linle imentions to 
ttonom,cally delXh fmm South Afnea (Amold 1 Y79:(,2-67, HoI. Arnold (I Y79:O I) 
,ugge,{s that South Atiica wag indirecdy supportcd by allocating de,dupment aid lu 
ne'ghbuunng wumric" Inde~d, {fie O[)A {() Bo{,wana, Lesotho, and Swaziland was 
at its peak during the last decade of apartheid (see Figure I) . Due to their 
topographical situation, YO pereent uf dc"dopmem aid to thc,,~ ~ounlrie" WlI" 
md,re~lly ,uppurting SOUlh IIfn~a's economy too (Amold IY7Y:311. This OOA to 
ne'ghbouring countries diminished the ell;";{ of "Conomic embargus again;t Somh 
Afri~a . 
• 
. "" , 
i • 
"' 
.. .. ,; 
" 
, 
, 
I 
... 
FqLX" 1 OD/\ 9r",t, fram t- , D,\C to So cth M-e." Lo ,",too, S..-ozilono & So"..-o"" 
i2X 7c.)j 
An indirect meanS to suppott ap,1l'thcid was the US support 10 :---iational Umon 
for the Total Independence of lingula (L1\'!TA), The Smtth Afri~an apartheid 
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gm-ernmenl and the US had till' UNITA nobd group as a WmmOn ally against the 
sdf-prodamHil /o.larx;stg go\crnm~nt In Angola (Schraeder et aL 1')')R:115j. During 
the Reagm' admini,tralion (1981-1989) economic and military l1id to UNIT A took 
openly place (Yoon 1 9')7:5~6), With thi~ alhartce, the US actively 'lipponed jhe 
apmtneid go\cmmcnl in ilS slmwgy to mainlain the pohllcal system Ht Saud, Africa 
(ScilraederelaL 1')<)S'115) 
1.1 Foreig" donor> upposinl!; "parlheid 
A, ~mly as the 1960" Scandina,ian counlne, ha\'~ been a~li\'dy supporling 
am.-apmtheid organi,ations_ These ;'lC luded trade union>, community organi",niom, 
Hli(lliS youth, students arid W(lmen movements, as well as htl>itless, lawyers mKi 
religious ass.uciall()llS (llcarn 2000; \illr.;, 2001:1(9). Demnar_ has been the iirs! 
muntf)' 10 pmv"k ,IKh ~nti-ap~nkid aid. follow~d hy '<o",~y and SWeden (H~~m 
2(~H):8l7). fly the mid-l 'J80s, more countrie, had joined the emhargo against South 
A frica and sUPlX'rtell anh-aparlheid m,n-e'nems. F rum th~ mid-I 9S0s until 1994. the 
US anll the European Economic Coullcil" holh supporled SoUlh Alnean anti-
aparth~id mo,ements" ith USLl .,40 million (Hc~m 2()(1():817) 
Cold "ar development aid toctics (""e Chapter 2.6) have al", played ~ 
cortsiderahle role Ln South Africa's aparlheid hi story. When the IX' l iti~al situnl ion Ht 
SOUlh .'lInea dekriumt"d alter the 1976 ~welo upri sings, alll,-aparlh;ill assislatIC~ 
stafTcd indudmg mil,~'ry aid. I'or e.~~m pJc. the Alncan '<ational Congr~>s (A);C) 
m~mbcr> [oHm, cd (mming pmg:r:llnmes ill the Soviet Lnion. indudmg military 
tr"ining:. In addition, the SovietlJnion and F~ISI Germany provKied military a"i'lance 
to multiple liher~lion movement, throughout wuthern Africa such a' the A '\j(' allJ to 
tk SOll ih W e,t A[n~a People" Organi"'lwn (S \V Al'O) (Arnold I 97'): 111(,). 
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1.3 Aparrhdd and development aid 
The uniqueness of develnpmcnt aid to South Africa dunng apartheid was that 
granl , were glwn. legally or otocr",I><:, to Sou th Alii~a's ciVIl :lO<:iely d ir""tly, 
Through the ,urrolt of anti-apartheid mnvemellts, de\doprnent aid aimed at 
di,mantllllg Ik apartheid syste m, Al Ihe glolml politica l le\'el, however, economiC 
gaLll or political intl uellce 11a, been put flr,t Ibe US 1Il particlLlar has pursuit an 
ambi,,~ l en t policy. This is )llustrated liy the C S' sUPpol1 ot the ~p~rthcid 
govemment', Imtll app licalions and all li-cnmmuni"t conflicts. in 'pite nf inlemaliona l 
p"hlic pressure, wh il e atlhe s~me time allocarirtg resources to ~ n(L-apartheid :"oJGO; 
(KlotL 1995). 
2. Foreign aid during the tran ~ it i on period 
With the Ji,mantling of apartheld in the 1990,. Soulh Africa entered a 
tremulou:; stag" of transit lnll_ Develo pment aid in thi, period was ai med at ,ecuring a 
sm:ccssful change to ~ sm hl e denJo<;I'.1CY (Hearn 2()(x)), However, de\'elop men t aid 
w~s nO! entirely ~ It''lJsti~ ~nd d(}ll or:l often h",l polillcal or ~wnomic moll1!CS. 
An ililLstrati\'~ e"ampk of politi,ally moli,'atcd de"clopmenl aiJ " the 
Ta iwalle,e a id to Soulh Africa during tile 199()s, Taiwan ootlated [,S [) 10 million tn 
SOUlh Africa, in relum lor South Alj'i~a's intent ion to r",ognis..: Taiwan iMte~J ofthc 
P~opk' s Repubhc of China (PRe). Howe,cr, wh~n Somh Afm'a rnwscd lklr 
standpoint for ccononllc rCa'KJlIS III 1996, I aiwan pmmplly s lLspended furthe r grant:; 
anJ loans to Soulh .",mca (l:lond 2()() l:~2) 
During the tra nsition period de\"elop ment a Ld IlIi" a l<o been u<eJ to ;~tluetlCe 
South Amca's ecnnomic policie'_ We,tell) countries were seeking strong allies a lx! 
reliable tmding patiners in de\'eloping coun/rie,_ for thJt reason, oooor o tlk ia ls 
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rcgul~rly rcm;n,kd the SO\J1h African gm-emment that devdopment cooperation 
would .,cr,e mUllla] intern<L, (I:ludlem\er & Dub~ 1999.331). For example, !he CS 
p"C~,\U1gl:'.j (Iic interim government to ~dopl the lMF"s approach of "redi.mibution 
throug:h !'rowlh" jn,l~ad of "growth through rcdlStriblnion" Hnd to adopt lJS 
economic ideology (Ten-eblaIICbe 2()02cH3; Habib & l'atlay~:I",c 20()O:248). 
The A)lC', aim wa, to make' up [or the ap~rlkid', d~vdopmcnt b~cklogg 
through qUlck ecorlOtl\ic grow1h r"'Juiring <leady ecOJlflm,e growth . One way to 
achlCVC thl> was 10 atlrac( more jnlcma110nai financial mal1:~s to South Africa. 
Wcsl~m go,-anmenl' llw d~ il ckar lhat South Africa could c.~jXXl a flood or for~ign 
im-e_mnems If It were to adopt ortnodox, market-fuendly ecoJlOmic policle< (Gumedc 
2(05). Thi~ pr~%I'rc atTect~d lhe po,i -aparlheid C\;onomi(; policy dirtttion of the 
AXe 10wartls r~cognistng lhe' ["IF as a "IrJl~g:lG dndopm~nl parlnn IHond lOOI 68). 
In 1993, lhe lrJn<iuona l govemlllffit oolTowed US!) S511 million from the IMf 
(Bond 201ll:6H). The secret condition< for this loan implied that the ~'Conomic polley 
would continue ~~ hcfore rcgatdkss of ihe outcome of Th~ lq q4 election. Th~5C 
condition, ailll~tI to rntl>ure W~sl~m inve.'lOrs and mclutled a policy <imilar \0 
.<lrucluI1l1 adju<hnent programme., <uch as lower import tarilf~, cuts in stat~ spending, 
etc. (Bond 201l 1:6H). Consequently, po<t-apartheLd cconon\lC straiegy was 
international and friendly towards lh ~ tr~~ market system, in ~ccordano;;e wilh CS and 
Furopc (FU) economic ,lmlegin (T crr~blanch~ 20()2: 10 I ,1(6). 
Th~ newly e<tabli shed co ntidence of foreign donors in th~ SoUlh Alric~n 
govemm~nt led 10 a ,.~dlcal ch~ ng~ in The di~lribut1on of Soulh Alii<;;~n dc~dopml:'l11 
aid. Sinc~ 1994, development aid has largely being al located to the South Alrican 
gownull~nt '0 Ihat development issue~ could be addr~ssed by the go,'emment 
directly (Hearn 2(1m:~17). Con"'qu~n1 ly, direct iinanciaJ ~%iswnc~ 10 th~ civil 
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20(X):S17). Many N(;O, have ~ilhcr discominued th e ir activitie, due to a lack of 
limcimg arkr lh~ ~1c~'lions in 1<,1\14 or joined fon;e, wilh (he gO\'Crml1Cnl (Borru;icin 
20(}O:J94). 
With the tranSllion 10 dCJlloc[a..;y, there "'"8 a ,hili ~m()Ilg;;t dOllors from 
aiding {he ann-arallheid organi;;atiOllS in civil sociely to aiding dCmOCTdC." by 
iinaocinlly , uppor1ing lk SOlilh Aliican gD"CrrunCnj. During Ih is period developmenT 
aid wa. referred 10 as lran,iliollai aid: f""ili~~ling and ;;ecuring [he cSlabli,hlllC"Tll n[a 
dCIllocmllC 3nd equal soc iety (K gCk7,1 Cl ~1. 20(10: 3 5; Schneider & (,j lson I 99<):265) 
lhis de\Tlopm~nl aid ,,~s S~L>Jl by Imlllj "" " :illorHcrrn phcrromcnon whi~h w"" ld 
only ]a;;l utllii \1", elld of the century (Scimeicier & (;11;;011 1'J<j9:2(5). In pn"'li~c, 
hov.,c\cr, dc,clopmcnt aid 10 Soll1h Atrica h~s been i"cr~asi"g since 1')<)4. 
3. I'llst-apa11heid aid 
Soulh A:tri~a npcr;e,x;ed a major shift in allocation of dc\dopment aid 
resour~e" [ruIll an mili~l [lIndmg of anli-aparth~ld orgamsa1ions 10 pnoscnl-day 
funding of an A\.IC-led d~m()(TJti~ gov~rnrnen l (Harl~y & Ruk ~(~i3). ,\ftcr 1994. 
donors regarded South Africa as a -'potential locol11otiv~ for change'" (l,hikawa 
19'N:88). Posl-~partheid aid was cx!'<'ctcd to be ' horHcrm, suppolting the 
c~l<lblishrnm1 of a rclomle,l South Afm'an "ociely. 
J. ( Donors moti,'~' for d~, dopmcnt aid to South Africa 
(n the b~gin period of posl-apartheid, lhe South A[ri~a gO\Trrun~nl re~ei\T<1 
large donor ~oulriblll"'uS 10 eSlab lish II, n~w dcmocmcj and 10 grapple with the 
legOC) ofaparrheld (Pa<layochc~ 2006:1). In 1995 alone. &",lh Aliica rel'civcd mOre 
----- ---
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element to Japanese "";st01>,,." (Ishi\::a"-a I ~49;~7). 
n'G hplt>.se weI'. not ~l(l"" in ~f;Crihing ~ l e~ di"g regional role to the new 
South Africa. AI,o the '\etllerlands tu., Hsnil""d this rok 10 South Alnca ~s the 
follow,n!! statement by the Dutch Ministry of Development Coopemlion 1IIuslra[(l" 
"[South Air;,"1 has the potential 10 be the lX'liti,"1 ,,,,d eco"omical 
engine of the regHl" ( __ ). It i, ,mpl'>rt.nl [0 "'1']10£1 [he leadlng role of 
cooperation wutributes (0 " stable mld democf"tic COU1H (If the South 
,\ fric:m tnm,fOl1mlion ,- (M inllU/." 2(H"", lcardalion ~y aUlhor) 
The US and the EL have been i mp()rt~nt official foreign devd()pment Hid 
donots 10 SDuth Atric~ ,ioc~ the 1990, . From IY94 - lYY9, the US provided - US!) 
530 million 10 '>Duth Africa, whjl~ th~ EtJ pr'(l\'ided an additiomi CSD 4~O million 
(H,am 2000: 891: orcn 2007b). OlhG" s igndic1nl 10'''ign donors to South .-\ frica are 
the Nordic countrie" Oelmany, a,Jd the L-K providing hetwGen USD 15 million aud 
US)) 45 mill iou ~nmJally since I 994 (Ileam 2000 891; OECD 2007b) 
The ide~ thaI dewlopment aid w()Uld only be for a brieftransiliotJaJ period Jm, 
bGGn sfrcssGll hy Swell."" in its '''root C","'lry Siratcgv fi". S .... "dish IJcl'c/ol'mcn/ 
Cool'cmlioJl wilh Sowh .-Jjnm !OO4-2(j()<J: 
"Following the ANC's electoral "io(or,' ""d the o(ll1,tinl!i(lll of a 
Gowmm~m of Natioll"1 Unil)'_ the humanil<tri,," progr"mme wo, 
(rollsform ed ;n I <i<l5 into , regu be development e[~'P'-"-'!l ;011 pmg",mmc, 
aiming both m supponing demoo:;ra(j, rei'orm and oon:;01"iali", 'LIld 
connibming to I'0vert)' "11evjmion., ,'\ point of departure ill the 
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os';'tance ;;!\ollid k provided ill ,mm'-"ic ",,,a, during" hrief [ramilioTl 
jXric>cl" (S"cdi,h Foccigl1 Mini"r), 2(XI7)_ 
In short, foreign Jonor;; considered development aid 10 So" lh Alric~ alkr the 
lh;manlling of ap~rlhcrd to be short-term lran,itional, ;;uppol1ive of the emcrgmg 
democra~y aoo hut lJin!; on a ,Irong- reglOna] cco[lOrnic ~l1d 1Xllitic~ I to['c e. 
1n this period the developmenl ill , lil111ion< World Ij,mk and L\1F only pbyc<\ a 
minimal role a, a lemlmg in,lillliion to South }diicll (lkarn 2000:819)_ "Ieyel1hele;;;;, 
bolh had II ;;igniticant influeoce hy providing the Soulh African govemrncnt " ilh 
]:>olicy ~dvicc un land reform, homing, health care, puhhc worb, infra,(rudure. 
irnluslrial devdupmcnt ~n,\ rnl\CruecOnomlC policy (Hearn 2()(~ ):H19; Bond 
200 I :55.69). 
J.2 ,\ ~ 1 3rshall Plan for Sout h .. U rica'! 
Ihe newly elecled govenmlcul mh.:ritcd " soeio-ecoJ1<J11l Ic :lY:l\(;11l witn ~ 
racially <kewed history of oppreSSlOn aoo exploilalion lhal had lelt a larg;e proportion 
of its popnl~lion mar ... in~l iscd. 1)(1or and without adeqUllte health. hou<ing. and waler 
(l'adayach"" 2001'>:1). To resolv~ lh""" inherilcd issues, lhc govcmTl\cn\ considered 
adoptmg a reconstruction programme .ilmlar (0 lhe Marshall Plan (Naidw 2006: 111). 
The ANC eventually adopled the ltecon'lnLdlOn and Devdopmcn( 
Programmc (RIW) addre<s ing the initial development prohlem' of po,t-apartheid 
South Afnea thi, RD l' document formed lOC ba>c for lhe IlCw govcrnmcnt·, 
approach lo reduce )XJ\"eny ami me,! u.ahly (:\:lay 200::1:3 .7 J. The RDP was resembling 
the :\1arshalll'lan m bemg a demand-dnvcn apprl'och in,olving large infr~s!lUL(ure 
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program",,,>, incrc":lCd Pllhhc irlH'lm~nL and higher w<:lal ,"~urily spending 
(1\,,;doo 2006: 111-112). 
However, the ROP deYeiopmcnl aid am01m( did no( "'Ul ~om~ n~ar lh~ 
[mmen"" tlllanc~,1 inJcX:lion or th~ l\faThh.all Plan 10 Europe The US!) 1."1 hill ion 
allocated belW""" 194~ - 1951 jc> Eump" wonkl lxo \\'onh approximardy USD 73 
bil1io(l12 IOd.,)" whik DAC dOrlors ortly allocal~J ju,l over L'SD 111 hdlion in lhe 
po::rioJ 1995 - 1997. ~aidoo (~11I1~1 !!:n'es four additiona l r""sons why South Atrics', 
[""onstruction plan did nC>t <uccoed ;(l1h" "orne mannn a, lh~ r~c"'l>lructi()n plan in 
Furope: 
"first, South Africa had a ""')' low ,a"in~' ,me and 'hi,; ~ap could no[ 
""dily Ix: met through imortlalionai now,;, gi,'en lh~ recenl ('onsilion 
of the p<~"- "welil" or rorcign kn<\e" for cxtc-nding credit to the now 
govemm<-..,j_ r~ird, Ihc ,,,,pClCity ol"the public scrvice to roll out" m""i,-e 
investment pmgrmnme "as t;or ,hO<1 of ",pcelali"",_ La,lly, l~e lrend in 
t~c S"uth Africon "<,, nomy "OS that .... hen puhlic "penJing increa,cJ and 
domestic demand ms.c, oome"ic ,upphc-r' "cre n(~ able 10 ''''pond lO lhe 
increased demanu_ An incre",c in govcmmcnt ,pending w'~lld reS1l1t en an 
incrc,,,,,, in impOT"" (/\ aid"" ](l(l(d 11-112). 
Aparl Jium a m"ssive in\,e_lment in infra_tructufC. Ihe RDP poky ,1oc1lt"ent 
g'''~ l;llk 'lX'ciflc indlcalions on whot economic strategy was 10 be followed (Alibcr 
2003A75)_ Thi, lock of concrete recommendalion" e\"~nlllally ba~kfirud on the 
programme_ l3y early 1996. the m,lCro-eConOmK: Growth. Employment, mm 
Redistrihution programme (GEAR) wa, \ak"n up by Ihe South A[n~an g()vemmenL 1(> 
47 
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J~a! wi1h prcssing cconomic is.,ues like the ,,,,-''V lkpr~c_ialiun of thc South Af,-ican 
CUrrCtlCy (Mohte 2(}OO:58). H0"l'\ef. lhis prc'gr~mme 10<) priontised e~onunllC 
growj}, abo, e pcw~,.ty ~ II cvialioo . 
. '.J Ilc\,c(opmcnt aid distributiun 
('urrelll de\elupmem alJ 10 Sc,u th Africa Cc,mp">c< on ly 1 percent 0[ 
gu\'~rnmenr c't.pcnel ihlre (World lbnk 2(~nh). HOW~\'lT. lhi< perccnlagc 1S 
misleading- '" the impacl uf d~ydupm~111 aiel can h.w~ a far grem~r impact lhan lh~ 
flgur~ sugg~'m (lludlend.,.- & Dul", 1949:308). A hl'g~ parI of lhc SOUlh AI",-ic~n 
nali()lm! and pl'o\'inci~l hudgets (~'X) percent) i, <penl on salan.,; and olhcr- [~ i r1y 
fixed co<b (!:lorn! 2001:81). Rdalive to lh~ rcmaining budget thm i, ~v~ilahle fur 
rcpl'ioriti,ation. de\elopmcnt aid Ihm con,liluln ~n imporlant cont,-ibutiot). For 
cxamplc. d,',,,,r contl'ibution, tu lhe ltD!' In lh~ flrsl y~a)'s w~l'e mOre t1.1n ,jouhlc th~ 
cc,mribUlion of lhc Souj}, African goyemment (BndlenJer & Olll", 1999:308). Tc' a 
c~rtain eXl~nl dcyelopmenl aiel cao, lhcrcf.<lIC. he l'~t1i~lly 'hifted ~ccording l\J d0nor 
priorit,es (Bond 200 1.8 1). 
[),'oor prioritie, it) South Afric_a ha\'e heen in CUOCllJ]\;nc~ wilh lhe glc,bal 
dcv~l opmct)t ~id ~g~nd, "I" current d",elopmenl aid. focussing- bolh 0n ~conoJllic 
d~\'dupmml anJ baSIC necds (sce (,haptcl' 2.6). Th~ di<r,-ibll1ion of ODA to S0ulh 
Atnc~ (s~~ ("ahle 2. heluw) shows lhal 'SocIal infra'ln1Cmrc and ",,,-icc<' i, hy far 
the targC'l p:l<1 of (l[)A ~I!ocatiun, tn ~(lO5, hu,,-' evcr, lk ,-"Clo)' 'Economic 
iJllj-~'tnJClu{'C ~nd <c" i c~<' sl ill received the third large" influx uf ODA, This 
i'I<jicMc' tl.11, mo)'~ than tcn yc~r< aftcr 1994, Junurs slill cunsider ~~01wJllic 
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'O ir&ct nput '0 , f\.o prod uoib " of if\.o ",eto" ><;rirullt ... . ",,,"ufociuri r,. . ir","". ~",J<.ir(l. "r," IOL-<'ism 
"~cono""c ,.elor of c~, 'i,,,, ,, ,., '"*1'.,, :1",., 10 "'" rype of 90<"'" ()( ~r\'0:0'" f"Ovdod 
••• 1<1 9'"'''''' C~"€<'IYl""'" ",nili"u'io", otOr"" ' ~'n dotot roorg",",,, t; ,,,. moc ~ "'".i, t>" ";tI, n0 
p'~_ i rnpo_ ~GCtor ""mli'" 
For~l~n ,kvdopmml aid cnlcnng South Africa docs not directly flow into the 
hands of the 011 es m need In fan, lh"", is a cornpla aid 'y't~lll in which 
development resource, ,uch a. de\'elopment aLd. tec hnic:al a"islall~~, lllall'rial 
donatio '" or loa"!;, c irculate hctOfC feadung Th" benefLciari",_ The complexity of the 
d~ydoplllenl aid <Ii'lrihUlion 'y'tcm can be mUI/raTcd with a flO"'cllan (o;ee Figure~, 
1>dow). 11ll'>ltably. a ;uhslantl:cl part of lhe dcwlopment aid r e:;(llUce. is ah,orhed by 
thrs system to >llPfl<lt1 itself. 
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The S,'Ulh Aji-ic~n guvernment h~" a stwng 1ll11ueDli~1 role III lhi" complex 
J~vdoprncnt 'y"tem, In the )xlSt-"pmtheiJ penod, de,-clopmem "id i_, pred(lmmantly 
~lI,'Cat"J dir~clly lo th~ ~",'emment [or [\lnher "llocmio n_ In fact, deyclopmem "id 
h", h""n budgc!ed by the go,emmem as a large par! of the spending budget of (he 
R[)P, A,ld i\1011all y para., talals", e,g. Ihe [ndependelll Development Trust (IDT), ha,e 
lil<:king c"pa~i ty (A hner 2(X)2; 1 7- 1 g)_ 
Although ""oc South Afri,," based K(;(t, dId 'lOt o'-erc(Hne the period of aid 
fatigu~ of th~ 1 (~)()_,_ others lIl"n"gcd to d""nca lly increa_,e their int1uence_ At Ihe end 
" AI ("-'r (200 I ,,(lj ,~I-"-" to , p,rd"I.1 wl><" liruroce>"," lI;'oo [rom boll, _~u,c"fTlmC'T}1 arul uonor 
'~"-""C~', 
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African eco '\Omy. By 1'198 tloe l\GO ,ector had grown into a ZAIt 9.3 bl ilon m.Justry, 
~olllpnsmg 1.2 perccnt of the GI'O'8 Dome,ti~ Produ~t (GDP) (Swilling & Russ~11 
~()02 I~) 
Presently intenk'ltional funding "f South AtTican NGO> is mo,tly pmJ~d­
ha,"'d (Bomstein 20()O: t95). As a result, tlk: intl'nml structurcs of NGOs nre 
mcrcasingly diftlcult t[) finan~~ '" donors arc mtJihly and unwiUing- t[) pay lor 
indired cust. such as ovc,he~d or ,alaries (H[)n1stein ~OOO:195), Therefore, NGO> are 
increa,mgly tummg to th~ Soulh iUrican go\,emment ill oh tain funding r~""urcc~ 
(SwlHing & Rnssell 200~:11, Harley & Ruk 2003), This is illustrated by the South 
Alrican govcrnment'8 c[)ntrilmtlon of ZAR 5.8 billion in 1998 to thc I\On-protil ,ector, 
42 percenl of tillS ,ec(or'~ towl lundins ('Swilling & Ru"dL ~(lO~:35). Th" ~n'a(cd a 
growing dependmce "f NGOs on gonTIlJllcntal su!-'ron, and ha' he~n sug-gesteJ to 
dlmindlth~ po\\a [)f t\GO, to cnlici,~ the governmcnt (Dc Jager ~O'')('' 1(7) 
3.4 I. dc\'elo,'lllcnt aid ,till tran,itional'? 
A cle~r distincti[)n can h<: rnad~ bn'Wan d~wlopm"nt ~"l during tile apanheid 
~ "d posl-apanheid periods . Prior t[) I <J-94, de\'l'l"pm~n( aid had bCcrl gencra lly 
' ''pporting anti-aparthcid movem~nt< in the S[)ulh Afri~'m ,o~lCI)'. Howe,'er, lium 
I (JY4 onward, " m~j"r injection of devd"pment a id ,uppcmed the new d~m'--"Tdll~ 
govemment (s<hm'idn &. Gilson 1999:265), This post-ll;94 de\'eiapmenl aid was 
dC8ignated a< tran,itiOlnl aid: 
"Aid 10 Soulh AI'ric" i, fmmed as "/'an silion support' fnrthe emerging-
Mm"""",y' (Department of Fillan"c, inl C1"ic,," w" h the IJirectCll', 
Intcrnat ion"1 DC\'elopmeIl1 f'inimcc, Prelo,-i •. II JUTlC 1,),)7 ill '>chneider 
& (;il,OO\ I'rN265) 
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This tratlsl1iooal aid was re£arded as a shun-term intervention to support a 
s(able and rapid transition to democracy. TI"s aid was mitially npectGd to OCcVlllG 
redundant by the end of thG t\\-cmicth ccnrury at thG latest (Sdmeiu~r & Gibvn 
1999,265). Ho\\nn, as lh~ ~ntl ofth~ ~~ntury wa, ~oming: ncar th~n: was llU u~din~ 
in ur n'l'n lalk of n:UlLeing u~Vl'lopmcnt a id to SVlLth .\[nea, In 2000, tl", [kparlmml 
of Finance ewn stated in an Intematiot,al De\'ck,pment Co-oper~tion repo ]t that the 
duratio" of dc\ clopmcnl aid shoul d be CXlctldcd: 
"All donOj~ came 10 South Afj-ic, through tmn,ilionJI "id, whieh was 
e.>:p"Cled 10 be ,ho" lived ~fC<"e 'Ild more 00 ')0"0 ar. realising thm the 
comple.>:itie> uf tbe Suuth Afnc:an d~\ elopm~nt land,cape ar~ such that 
lhere i, a need f,,,- lbem to exlenJ their supp"rt by a few 1T",,"~ year,' 
U'gciczael al :'I~~U~). 
Also dOTI<Jj~ \x;cam~ aw~rc vf tk n~~d Iv ~.~t~nJ d~"dopmmt ~lll to SOOlh 
Africa, In May ~OO2, th~ I'n;sidmt of J~pan'< lmmmlional Cooperation /"gene), 
(lIe'I.), Mrs Sauako Ogala, reassured Soulh ,\[rica of Japan' , commitment to 
continue dorlatin)! de;-clopm ent aid: 
"Japan, througn .IleA, will strenglnrn tecnni c"1 anJ Jc'"c\opmrnl aiJ I" 
Afric", parlicularly ",ith a f"cll.' on community tL'Yelopmcnl ""d 
emp<m'efITlC-n1 Dr pe,~le tnroogh c"{'aeny ooi ld ing, OgatJ said. ('residen! 
Mb<ki, in rurn, "sured South Aii-ids leooing role ill suppucTing lh~ 
denlopmem abo of it> n~jghholHing countries' UleA. 2()()4) 
,\1", Sweden reass ured it> de\'elopmenl aid rclation with Soulh Africa 
Howcvn, Sw~d~n ockllmdeuge< thaI present development aid has entered ~n entirely 
n~w pmtnenhip as compared to aid dUl;ng apanheid and the transition to democracy: 
U
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
"0,,", tho 1 .. ,1 d""aue. Swelk.,,' , p.rtner,hip with SQWh Africa hoi< Ihu., 
Jcnlopeu in three "a!!"" from numalBlarion ,up~rt via rtgub,-
dcvcl()pmenl a""i,lanC" 10 brrodc'f coop",alion. ,V hil~ the lalkr "ill 
<<ag~'. "h" prescnl d,,"el"pm~"1 cmp"ralion 'hall be ,ran;;formed iOlO 
h,-oadcr c()()pcrdlion, ba>,d 0<1 mutu"lny "nd joint linan"ing" (Sw~uish 
Foreign Mini",r)' 1(117). 
Chapter 3 
A, a re'lill of 1()]1.,ign donors continuing their mppon 1O lh~ Soulh Alrican 
gov~rnmenl, Ihe amount of nel aDA 10 SOlllh /\flica lIlClcased f,,,m I:SD 487 milhon 
to 700 mlliion \x;l"'cl'Tl 20Q{l and 21Hl5 (World Himk. lOO7b). Th~ Soulh African 
g",-emmen\ do,,, nol s<:~m \0 l:x; worfieli ahout possible negalivc dfcd' of 
dc,-dopment ald. l\lo",o"~r, SOlllh ,'<iri ca's tinance \lin;ster rrev"r Manuel hHs ~Wn 
recently empha>Jzed the ,upporti,,~ rok that <lcvclOl'ment aid can play 111 po\'eny 
Hllcviation ,n Africa and South Af""H: 
trade, intcmatiOI~,1 
final",e, and d",-ciopmC'tl1 .id - ne",l, 10 he "lpportiv~ of grow,h "lid to 
pro,-kk- th" right ioc"ntiv", for ,mall African ,Iales 10 pursue reform" 
(Manuel 2003:18), 
Trevor Manuel indicate, thaI d~vd"pment Hid has to il<lju>! a, followed I" be 
supP<-'rtJ"~ of gWWlh: 
'Tkre neeJ, '0 be more [de""lopm",,, ""i,tanccllllall the reC~'Tlt ,Iighl 
Tc>'e"aI oi' the IrenJ ot u.dining ,id Ie,-ds ."-\c",,kTa!c'd p"'b'1'ess a1so 
Teq llirc" mOl" ond bel1er-U1rg. teu tin,,,,,i,,l ,u pport for poveny reduction. 
paTliculariy in policy area, imporcant for x hi""ing the Millennium 
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,ani ialion" ('>'1 am",1 21111,': I ~J 
Chapter J 
11 is difficllil [0 pul all exact lIme pel;oJ on a Iran,,;l i<'n p~r;od, H<'w~\'er, in 
the case of the ' hr.hall Plan only th' ee year> "I' la rge Ii n~r>c i ~ I input 10 rump<: wa:; 
eno ugh h' pn'pci Eurvpe's oconvmic growth, Arkr lh]s p~riod, Ihe mno llnl (}f 
tieyciopmenl ",ti quickly decilned, II is not sU'l"'i,, ill g that h undr~d flfty yeo" of 
uneycn Soulh African devcl,'pmenl lake mor~ lh~n a coupk of y~an 10 (}Ycecume. In 
n;Cl, de"ciopmcni ",ti to S(}ulh Africa has occ(}m~ as " pennalll'lli pan of the 
ti~velopmenl land",ape, Refe rring In presenl-day developmenl ~ jd 10 Soulh Africa as 
lransil i<'nal ald moY, the r d,"e, no longer be apprnpriale, 
4. C[)nclll~ion 
A ticr Ih i'1.:en yea'" " f democ ro Cy the 'lTIUl,iliono j' "[1'ix co tieyci(}pmenl aitl is 
que'li on~hj e, The ODA ligures show how tleyciOpm~lll aid has gratiually hecome a 
slahk [aclor ill ih~ Sumh Afric"n soc iety, ~ilher acting through th ~ gm'ernmenT or 
lhrough ciyil "oc iel)" rhere i, no c<'1H~mu' among,t (he", i sts if preS<:nt development 
aid as a re,ma nent s<,urce " I' income 10 S,) ulh Afric ~ n devclopm~nl bndsc"pe ha, " 
, ign;flcant po,,!;ve ell""t to po.wel'ly ~lIeviation 
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Chapter 4. Future development aid ill South AJrica 
nc,dopmenl Hid 10 Soulh l\liica has gradually e,IHbJi,lrd i1o.<:1f as H 
p<:mlHn~lll facior in lhe South Afri~"n rlevelopm~nt lan!\"'''pe. lnslearl of pmvi!ting 
init ia lly ,oon-term ~llPpOfl 10 a II:m,iliol1al polilical 'y'km. developmeTlt aid" 
currently 1.>t:ing applied to "ddr~" the c()mplex Soulh African rn,"cl()Jnlcnt i,sue, a, a 
pennanent form of collnhomlion between rlono,", ond the Soulh Atl" ican gOl'ernment 
(see Chapter 3). nus change oi"rdation,hip. howevcr mcall, Lhat the dl"cctivCllC>S 
alld possibl~ oownsirn" of d~vdopmcnt aid must he ,-..con,irlererl. for e~ample the 
'Hl of "'rl depenrlency. 
III the pre,ent de\-eklpm~nt lanrl",ap". airl to SOllth Africa i, p,,:dominaTilly 
allocaled by dOTlo,", di.-.cctly to Ihe South African g()vcmm~1\L Through allOCali()n ()f 
fund, the govm1lIocnt Call ' Iroll!!ly affecl tll<; COtIT<~ of de\'eloprn~nt aid a"""rrli ng io 
tkir own priorilic<. ,och a, ",rlueill!! the South AfricaTi bllrlg~t Mt,cit anrl or 
stirnulatmg (,mss Domestic ProrltiCt (GDP) growTh (Biggs 1997: Jlar>eh 2001). The 
Non Cowrnrnenllli Ot'ganiflll lion (KGO) ,""ctot' i, an im[K1rtant sub-conlraclot' of 
go\-emmenl Jcwlopment projects and NGOs arc heavIly Mpenrlem nl1 government 
,omce, for th~ir in""mes. 
The Cllr,ent Mhat~ h~tv:een rlc\'Cloprnent lheorist> from \-ariou' school, of 
thOllghts i, tOcll'SC!\ amund (he vario u, a,pec(s of development aid and alwmHlive 
ide~, (0 ochieve povcrty alinJali()n (i<T Chapter 1). Thi, chapter aims al inve'tigating 
the crilique, of the rlomillating "'hool, of thought the main,tream. neoJiboora l, and 
mdical-Idt idea, in a South Atl ican conkXl a[HI how pm[K1,ed ~ltcrnHti\-cs wOlllrl 
shap<: tk South Afril«ll developmenT lanrl;;cape in its cf1bl't, of ~"'elty ~lkv lalioTl, 
---~-- .. 
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I. Trickle uown 
The South Africao gc>vernmen t regnrd ' gwwth c,f its economy a, the main 
requir~ment l;:,r poVGrty alleviation (Manu..,] 2003:1S). I hi< i, retl ected io it< 
development programme, ,uch as GEAR and /\ccGkmtcd and sha r~d g"",th 
ioit ialivG· South Africa (A'!,:lSA) ,,·hic h haw among empllilSis 00 macro-crc'oomi~ 
rdorm <imilar to the Wa<hingwn C'0n<ctJ.S", (Bigg, 1''1'17:48-49; A,giSA 20(}6; 
W,Jliamson 2000). OnG of the re<l ",-'m that econo mic development is gh'Gn nlloch 
allGIltWn m So ut h Africa ', deve lopme nt appmaeh ;;; b0:,;ause of"n a"umed tri~k l~-
down elreet as spin-o lI uf ",:onomic growth. 
A~cordmg to thi, neoli~,,\llI'Ickle-dowo ctti::cl. economic growth is likd y to 
occur in region, w ith iovestrnGot power. "fiGIl industria li,ed and urban area, (({()odt 
19Wd I4). In nccordance with tho.; maimtrearn view. a trickle-dow n ettect c>f th i' 
gfo"1h "ill spin oil to lhose with less or no inw<tmelll power ,ueh a, peoplG lh-ing 
benealh t he poverty li ne (Such, 2(X)5 b). Giwo ""'GIlt ewnOUll~ gmwth of South 
Africa over th" In,t couple of ye;trs, an avcomgG GO!' growth of 2 .~ percelll betv .. ""o 
I 'J94 - 2(X)3 (Na i,1oo 20()o:1 1 I) a m,kle-down dfect ,hould be notlceahle by 00W. 
lloogevGCn & b.dcr (20IlS) f~ulld that rer capit~ hou,e1lC>ld e.~JX'n dit LJ rcs In 
South Afnea actually declilled for th" lowest cla;;;;e;; 0Ver tllC penod 1995 200() and. 
in < r 't~ of a gl'0"'ing GOP, inequality ha, mcrea,ed. In 211111, the poore<t qu~rti le 01' 
the South Afriean population only contributed L.'1 percent orthe tot al natlOnalmcomc 
"hilt the bourgcoi, eiik (16.6 percent of the p0pIllntioo) gGnemted 72 percellt 
(T em:bl""C he 20()2:36). 11,e,e i ,)dices ilhlstrate tlu.t the acc umulation of wealt h a, a 
resu lt 0f e~onornle growth hm not h;,netited the jl(>orcst q u"rtilG III South Africa . 
The differ~nt cla.,,,< 01' S<)uth Atric"', "",,c iety "r~ pri mari Iy along racial I io", 
and " I~gacy of ulle'lu,"ll devel0pment ,luring apartheid (Padayachee 2006; Adnto et ~ I. 
-._-----
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2(06). The largcsI part of the lowcr cla>se$ of South African people live and work in 
the mral arca> (Amin 1 '.1')7:')). Tfle wldcrd,'wlopment in lowe;;t cla;;se;; Q[ Ihis "-,,,iely 
i,. e'peci"Uy in Ihe ruml ,neas. s.o ' lTOng Ihal lho.;,e da>s<:> arc unlikely 10 pmtit from 
any trickk-dm" n eff""l a;; too lillie ~l'onomic gmwth will ~",c", in their immediale 
,u[~o"nding (Frank 1966:"27). A r\~olikml form of capi!alism in which d~vdopnwnt 
aid i, merely a ll ocated to indu,\nali;;ed and Ulban ,ne,,, would worsen the silUl,lion 
I"r Ih~ poore,t an..l ... ~ak~>t of soC,-:ly (/ 1 art 2006: 22) . 
2 Govemment capacity 
TI,e m'tiority of development ald re",url'e>, including Offkial Developmenl 
A»i,taoc~ (aDA), are directly allocated to tho.; South Ajj' ican gov~rnm~m to 
cncoumgc an inlcgroled ,kvdQpmenl "PpTOach [or po,,~rty "Ilcvja(ion. Ho ... c"~r, Ihe 
SQuth African puhlic seclOr i, exp .... riencing m'tior "'ap'"'ily problems, re,"lting in 
de,"e loprncnt hacklog'. aoo fr~qllcntly in a n"ezlng or ~"cn '''turning of unu;;ed 
,icve lopment n;",-,"rc~, . 
An illllstml,,"e ex'''nple of SQllth Afnl'a';; "'apaLlly problem i, the Dep"Tlment 
of Vv' clfar~ (\1 arai;; 200 I :2(7) atod the D~panment of Social SCt'ijces (nond 2{~) 1:8 1 ) 
,p"nding only li'act ions of lh~ir p<,,,~ny ",lid budge[>. TQ rewlw it, capac ity 
probkm. 11k.: SOUl1, Alrican gov~rrull~l1t chnrUlei> ,k"dupm~nl 0,,1 through par:tSlalal, 
,uch as tlK: ll'ldependenl lkwloprnenl rlll;;i (1])1") w achieve poverty redlll'!;Qn 
(Aliher 20()~: 18), or through Min, to proyide sen'ice <ldivery (I larky &. Rule 2(~)J). 
Thi, itl!~'\.kj><:"(knc~, howevcr. c",al~, anoth~rprubkm. 
A large P<"t of th~ N(;O ",",ctor', linaOCLng COmCS Ii-urn 11K: Somh African 
govern ment. In 1998, thi , contribution already madc up 4"2 [<:t"Cent uf [he IOtal l\(;O 
blldg~1 (Swi ll ing &. Ru>><:U 2002;35 J. Con><:'l,,;.:nlly. many o[ Ih~"" Ng,m;"oliQlls [cd 
bolh tina rl(;ially ,md polilically pre,>un""J IQ [oc", on '~rY1Ce deli,~ry u,ing [ast-
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track methods (:\1Hnus 2001:285). til is prc"me distracts '\(,Os from focussing: (}n 
:lUslmnable, long-term d"vcl('lpm~nl appmHchcs. pwplc-ccmrcd pani~ipatory 
processes, community C<lpa~ily-blLijding, etc. fh e prl'ssu re Oil Nnos ~18('1 undcnnincs 
the aulonomy of tr..:<e orgamsations. 
The South African gu'cnmlGO[ plTscnl]y lacks the capacity to set up and 
manage poverty allev,ation pr()8r~mmcs or (0 all,'cHlc development Lundin!!: 
dfectively (Rond 2001:144). As the ,uITenl ,-",pacily i, already inadequate. il is 
que,tionable if a large-sca le incrl'<lse of aid wou ld be pwp:mil'1laldy HS effe,ti\'e 
(Kraay & Raddatz 2007:317)_ Y~t, d(jnm, oominuG f",llssing on the Somh AII'iean 
g('l\·cmm~'T1t 10 recii"Lnbulc development aid in,lead allocating resources lo the '\GO 
,Cd,'r directly. lncr""sc, of ,kvelopmcnI. aid inlluxe, should consider focusing: on 
,u,tainahle capacity \,,,i ichng ~t all lnds of "-'Clely, mther than on mcre~sing (hc 
bnrdcn ofan already ",ver, lreld,ed burcancrallc system (!>(md 2(01). 
3. Aid dependen<:y 
The CrCalwn l,f H S!Hte of aid depe ooency is one l,r the nwin argummis of 
nCl,libe[,,1 lheori,is again<l large-s.c~Jc to['cign developmenl Hid inf1ux~s (e.g., 
Friedman 1955 in SvcnSS0n :'.000:443: (iuplH d HI. 2()06j. Dev~lopmen( aid gcncmtcs 
dependcncy by ~llowing WUT\lnes to anifLcially raise thc recipi"n!', govcnlr1)cnl 
budget ~boJ\'C ils ,df-generated mcome (f"edm~n 1958 in Sven,,,-,n 2000:443). Such 
Slale (jf aid dq1elldellcy remits in high 1m, ["Ie" which discourages people to work 
HT\d tmps aid recip i~nt countrics inl(j H cO!llinu(ju, need [or de\"elnpmcnl ~id (Krauss 
19R:l: Collier 1999:528). 
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A~~ordil1g lL' Brii uli~TJl', (2()C(1) aid ocrcndcncy thrc'hold cd )0 III percent of 
tile (,ro" Nmir>nol Inc"m~ (ON!)", Sr>uth Africa i, ckarly ml ",d depende"t wilh a 
Gl\l oj r>niy 03 pcrccnl. Tilis I",,· (,'ll is cotl'idered os a majM !Xl"rive f"atur~ of 
South Africa's "'''''K)m;,' syslem by JIt:l,liheruk H(jv.'n'n, this GN! mJe.~ is 
mi.lcaJing ~s (he pror<)ttl(>rIa\ amounl of dewl()rm~nt aid Ie> project" is much high.,,-
than III percent ("~e "I"" Chapin .>"1.3, puge 4g1. Uncie, the CUITent dnd,'prnent aId 
trend OltlpmfL\able ~Cl(),,'<, '1!ch Health arid Education may become ~v~n more depend 
an aid llk,n lky alre~dy are I S<:hncldcr & Gil'''n J 999: 270). 
Th" radical ldl coDside"" anything Ie" than a wtai abanciolllllml oj I,'relgn 
Jc,c1opmcnt ~jd ~s " seri"lL' Inl'col 10 (he "',","eignly of local ~c"t)omi~, a, donor 
~()u tltries ",mid U:it: devciapu>t:tll aid as ]evem!;e la f,"",ilil~lc polilical ar lc!;l,lmi,'e 
chang~" in II;., reclpi enl' s counlry. Such pown Im) l, Gould, fl'r nample. he u:it:d hy 
rowel' blr>"h "uch as the I Jni!ed Stales 01' the Eucorean I Jn~lll 10 d ireel Soulh African 
socio-cel'nomlc s(nlctures to tlle'l' reSfl"C1JVe hcneli!s_ Therefore. Ihe radical left 
argu~s. Ihal lhi, glL,hal ')'Siem should Ix rephlG~d by an ~el'OOmlC model thai alll'ws 
both the core and the [",rirhery to have equal orrortunilies to Mvdor_ 
IJow~v~r_ ~ 1r>lal ~b~1I,!onment of j()r~ign d~velopme1lt aid would h~Ye hrg~_ 
negativc imp""!s 011 the current l\GO sector r>'- South Africa, It "'r>uld I'cmr>,c an 
incomc 'l) mGe iiulll a ,""elL'r lhal addresses poverty is;"c, currenlly oc!;kelni by Ihe 
go"emm~ nl. Allhough tlle NGO ;ector has ii, limilations (,e~_ e.g., S",iilling & 
Russell 201l~) it can be cr>rIilide",:d as an imlX't1ant countel'bahnce to tile CllTJ'C1l1 
Sr>uth African eapitalis( markel eel,nomy_ Thndorc, nWre dUecl sup!X'rt at'local 
NGOs by devclapmenl aHI dr>1I(>[; may achicve a more ctTcclivc improvement oflhe 
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well-being oflhe poo'e,llhall an abrupl dOl,bling 01 aid dircdclil0 th~ Sonth Ali-iean 
govemmett!.. 
4 Relaxed budget con,traint, through den:inplllent aid 
Tne currenl lrend of innea,ing Jev"IOflm~nl aid. SUPP()r1~J by mainsln:am 
Ihe clIn-elll developmenl aid framework lS nol a ma~hin~ lhal produces Jevdopm~nl 
",lien mOttcy is ~n!ered';_ Rather l!.ewlopmett! aLd relaxes lhe hu.dgetary con,lraill1s 
UlfrasllUeture inv~slmettlS (Addi ,on el aL 2005: 11·-1). 
Th" In million South Ajri~~ns th~l ar~ currently in J ~,-penlte need of ;;""'ial 
grants make up approx. 211 p'.;rcenl of lhe 10l~1 South Ajri~an population 
(Terrehlancne 21'oJ6) . A douhling or e\'en qlladrupling of foreign d~wlopm~nl ~id 
wonld, lher~fore, ,1111 only be a melap nmical drop 111 the oc·eall wilh this huge l1lllnho.:r 
lempomrily, "ould ha\'~ inl~l",littg ]Xllionlial 10 improVe lh~ l'Um:nl dndopml-nl ~iJ 
framework, "" lhal projecI;; are execllled more swiflly and more profe«ionally. 
While Ine di reel "",o nom><: spin-off of dewlopment aid in.::rea,es may only he 
marginal, :<ome theOrosl' are 01 the a"umplion that all i ... "rea,ed perception of people 
lhal lh~ir tt,,~ds an: lak~n :;<.;riously and "n: adJn: ,,,,d promptly will ~ln.:ad" improw 
lheir wel l-hemg (see, e.g., Ea,lerly 2()()6). However, developmell1 promise, lhal an: 
not k~1'1 or only aJdressffi alter a long period ofllme will creal~ cynicism, h"U,lnll ioll 
and r~sentment (D<luconl,agos & Paldam ~I XI(:-':246). Tltis prediction na, strong 
" Thi, iliu,:r.n\ 0 ciariiic",ioo i, mao:k hy Hc'nTIan Sped,,,,", Hood Clute""" \k"urin<:, Dutch \jini,;try 
of F<E'ign Affai" (in Vlll'l (k Wid 2007:1:'). 
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,imilaritie_< wilh lk fnL,lmlion anJ soci"llInr~,t in SoUlh .\II-lCftn area' where wI'vice 
5. Fxchangl; rate 
1 .aT'gc influxes of toreig n clHreocy call lead to an ani ricial overvaillalion of lhe 
",~ipi~nt"; CUIlTnc'Y, '" tocrc "now more 'hard ~urreocy' aga in>! tile r(:Cipicm'" 
currency_ Thi, ha, a negative eff"~l on the export of I h~ reclplent's ~oulllry. b~cm"~ it 
'Will now co"t foreign huyer> rdatin ly more local curre ncy to huy a product (Szirmai 
2005:~87). rhi, CUIlTn..:y probkm has blTll i,knlili"d by Krall;; as a major lX'OI)OmLt 
d i,;ad\"a ntagc of development aid Lntluxe, to developing counlne_, (see page Xl_ When 
impol'{S arc cheap<.:r 1.ha" expor ts an impediment is created for the illlemal market 
ClIITency volatilLl)' has been identified by South Aliica a< Ji,,-,onmging 
inn'lor, in tradable good, and ,ervicc, outside of the commodity soctor rhi , 
vola lility w~, ~bo lhc rc~<'(1n thal Sonth Africa tum",j down ~ hpi.lncsc loan oflJS[) 
75 nullion (Bond 200 1.58), S igniji~'1nl fordg:n aid inj]u .t~' ,honld, th~1\:lo1\:. ~ I"a)'s 
be con,idered with caution and may have pL..-sLmng negatiw side-effect; on the 
ecooonli e, of the reClplcnt' _, cou n1<)' , 
Whik an o\'c,,'alu~ tion of the SOlllh .'Ifricall currency may be adv~nwgoou,; 
for the impon of ,;;enlml fore ig:n inl~nmxhal" good;, lhere will be ",v~1\: negall\T 
effects on South Afri"a'_, expol1 md,,_,try such ", the agri<:ultural seclor. /\ SUJJL'Tl 
doub ling of dcvelopmcnt wd inl1ux would lllCreforc result in a 10';'; of cmploymcm ill 
thi' 'Cdor 
" , 
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6. Conclusion 
Tn thc currcu( eco t)omic oml ide<)logical framework of South Africa. an 
irn;n'lbe In de\idopm~l1t aid i, lIu likc1y to be the HlOSt ctticicn( contrihu(ion to 3chic"c 
.,mlainahlc poverty all eyial iotl, The post-apanl",id gowmmem', attt"mpt 10 allevlllte 
poverty lhrollgh 11k: Rcwnslmction and l)cvelopmcnl Programmc. a Marshall Pbn-
like approach to uplift S()tlth Africa's poor, n"lcd 10 matenahse and IS curremly 
replaced by a ,trokgy lhal pr;'),itiscs economic growth. ,Imilar to the Washington 
Con,m,u,. S,mllar to 11", faihng: of tlk: Wa,hing(ou COuSe'U.slI' dunng the 1980, and 
cady 199(". this dcvelopmen( opprooch ha.' thu' far not achieved ils goal ofuplifling 
the pooT~sl of Soulh Africa's people. On the "outrmy, income iu..:q llolity has been 
increasing .,ince 1')')4. 
The current 'latus of de\'dopmenl aici 10 South Africa i., heing r~garcieci as 
(ran,ilionol hy hoth the Soutb A li'ican goyern menl aoo donor.,. J 10wCYer, thi.' ,latus of 
kmporanlll''" prevent' NGO, and cievdopm~nl programme, 10 e,tablish " ,olid basi, 
for suslai""ble, long-Imll devdopment approaches, or to "",in the tnlS[ of 
underrrivilegt"'1 an,1 poorly serviced communities. Acknowledgement by donor, and 
the South Alriean government thaI deyelopmcnt aid in South Africa i, goi ng to 'lick 
oround Jor a long limc 10 come will l;,cilllo1e th<: IO\looing of such broad. long-tel'm 
programmes La adcir~ss the full complexity of South Afnca's per>isling poverty l>SU~S . 
The cun'em econo mic aoo ideological lralTlt"work of South Africa ha.' allowed 
aparthei d inh .. Ited po,'c,t)' i"ue, to gct worsc. Thi' l\.1' not neces"l rill' heen a lock of 
willingoc%, hut rathcr thc con",,!,, eIICl' of a mlsj "dgcment of pr'ori lizing econom ic 
ond f,scal adj"stmcnt, and a lad of developmcnt capacity . This go\'cmment-s(ccred 
approach has re>ulkd III lll>ufficlenl ""rV1C~ ddi,'C[), and ~Y"'clsm wilhin 
commu"llics-in-nCl'd. An indls.criIlllnale increa,,, of cil'vclopmml a,ci would worlm 
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thi, problem_ Howe,·cr, heller- focm,ed or redirected uevelopmem aid r~'Our~~s coulu 
mu~~u contribuk to capacity building of govcmm.ont instiTution, ~nd s""ur~ the 
independence of I\(;(k 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Reference< 
Rcfcn::nccs 
Adalo, M., C~ttcr, M.R. & M~y. J. 2006, f!xpJoring poverty Iraps and social cxdusion 
in So"lh Africa ""ng «lIdli lalive ,md t[ lI~Diilali\'e d~la joumai ofDn e/opnJ("nr 
SllIdie,< 4 ~(2 ):~~6-24 7. 
Addi"" .. T., Mavrotus. (;. & Md,i II iHay. M 21)(15. Aid, denl rdief and new ",,,rc~" 
of fma]}ce for meet] ng the ~1 i Ilenninm Development (,oak Jouma/ o{ 
'"u'mmiu"ai AlIi,i,-" jl!-(~): I 1.1- I 2 7. 
A kxander, N. 2()()~. A" urdinary rUII'1/~v - ' ,I ,IlleS i" [hc Iran,"ilio" from apar(hcid /() 
demo<.'rI1cy in S""r/, fiji-ica . Universily of NaI~1 Prcss, Plclcrmaril zl>urg. 
Ah, A..\,G .. Malwanllil. C. & SlIhmilll, Y. 1999. Officlil] oc\'dopmenl a"lSlmICe 10 
Afncil: an ovcn Ie,,'. Journal o/Aji-ican i::cnnomie" X( 4):504-527 
Aliber. M. ~11I)3. Chronic povetty ill SCIl,lh Afnea: incLdence, Ciluses m;d policic:l 
Wnr1d Dc"c1ol'mcn/ 31 (3) :473-4911. 
Alirer. '1-1. ~OO~. f'o"crt}~eradicalinJJ and .,usrainahle dCl'eiOl'melll. HSRC PlIhli,hers, 
Cape To,,-n, 
Alibcr. M. ~OO 1 . Swdy o(th" incidcnce <m,} "alUrc ofchmilic pm'crt}' and 
dc"c/npm ent po/iry in Snwh A/i-i<-a. an nven-iew. Research report 
h IIp://'' ww . <0 'pn. org. Zil. 
Arnin, S. 1997. Foreword. In ' \1ami', Ii (ed.) Smdh Aj;';"a - limits w <-ha"g": The 
[k>/ili<:al ""o'lOm), 'llransfi>rmatin,,- Z~d Books. London, UK 
Amin, S, 1985. De/inking: Inwards a l'o/y<:eNlric wnrld. Zed Books. London, UK. 
Arnold, G. 1979. Aid in Afdca. Kogan Page, London, UK. 
AsgiSA. 2006, ,,1cceinalcd ,md shared growlh iniliatil'c - South Afi-ira. a .,,,mma,.y, 
The Pr~:lidl"ll(;y, Preloria 
Raucr, P. T, 1971, lils,'('nt on development: Siudies aud dcbares in d(~'clnl'mcnl 
economia. Wci<knfcld & )<ieol:;on. London. lX. 
Rcinatt. W. 200 L The Twentieth-C,'IlI",}" S""lh .,lji-ica. O'l:[onl Uni\'n;ily Pn;S:l, 
Oxford, UK, 
Rdlo. W, 2002 f'msl'c""<fior good xlnhaf governanre: fhc viewfrom ,he "·ollth. 
Reporl pn;parvd for the Bllllcie,lag, f cdcral R~pLLblic of (, elmany Foem on the 
global Soulh. Bang:kok. rhai land. 
Biggs, M. 1997. ('-elli"!; in!u GEAR ' Governmenl <lnd Ihe econoPn),. UniYCThity of 
Care Town Pre",. Copc Towll. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
B,'mL P. 2001. .-1gaiml globa' apartheid: SJ}wh _1jiwa me"'s liw World {J"nk. 1M!' 
and iJJlerJIatiU/1a1 .Ii ",wee. Uni, ersity of Cape Town Pr~ss. Cape T "wn. 
Il,'nd. 1'. 2004. S.olLth Arl;~a t~ckles global apmtheld; Is the rdorm stmtegy working? 
Sowh Allwllic Quartetly 1 03(4);8 1 7 -8J'OI 
Ilomstein. L. 2CJ()O. Institutiona l contc,t. I n: -'by. J (ed.l /'''''''1"1}' alld iJJequality in 
South Atriea: ·\fedillg Ihe challenge. David Phi lip Publi sher>., Cape Town. 
Briilllig~m. D. 2000. Aid dqJ<'lId",,('e ,;lid gowrntm('(" A Imqvi't &. Wiksell 
Inlcmmiolldl. S.tod;h"Irn, S"eJcn. 
Blldlemler. D. & Dube, N. 1999. Gender anJ Ofli~I~1 J~,d,'pm~nt assi,laoc~ m Soulh 
Africa. In. I:llLJlen..:ier, D. (eJ.) The fi",,,tli 11-""!len '., hud"cl. \1ega Print. Cape Town. 
Chakravarti, A 2005 Auf, in.,lirulioll' and developmeill." New apf'l"Ol",he. lo "mwlh, 
gov",.",mce and popcr/". Edward Elgar. Cheltenham. UK. 
Chang, H. -J. 2()(n (,',,,I;.a"-,,,;;,,". economic development aJld thc mle of the -'lale. 
I:ed Il(X'~S, Lo ndon, lJK. 
Chataway.1., Le\ idow, L. & Carr, S. 2CXXJ. Geneti~ engineeling or J", ck,pmenl? 
Myths and p<JsSlbilitie<. in: TIll'mas, A. & Allen, T. (eds. 1 !'''verl}' and 
developmenl illio the 2/" cent"'}!. (hu,rd lJni\·ersity 1'",,,. Oxf,'rrL 
Culiler. 1'. 2006. Arnean growlh: wily a 'I"g push"? loumal of Africall ECU/JOmie.' 
OO(AERC Supplement ~):l ~S-211. 
Col lier. 1'. I <'f)I-). Aid 'dependency': a critiquc. Journal "fAfrican r"'cotlornie-, ~(4): sn-
545. 
Consultative Commillee 2007. j he CololiI/x) I'law .fi)r "''')I>ewlive ccoJ!onJic and 
50dal deve/"pmeJII ill Asia (llId the I'acific. Retrieved 0 n II \1ay 2007 fmm URL 
.,~~ W. "oJ"", I.'-~:J)h! !li!ccg. 
COlllwall, A. & Bfl'ck, A. 2005 Whal 00 buzzwords do for development po lic'y? A 
~ritieal kx,k at 'p:lIticipation', 'empowerment' and 'poverty reduction'. '1Mi'd World 
Quarter-Iv ~6( 7): I 043- IOIiO. 
De Jager, N. ~O()(, rhe South African gove rnment and the app! ication of co·.opti,.-" 
power. Po/iti~o!l JJ( I 1: I 0 I -J I 2, 
[)oucolLliago" H. & P~lda"" ~1 20(16, Ai<.! etrectivene" nn accumul~tion: A mel~ 
study. Kyk/"., S'x ~):2~7 -~54 
E~sl~r1y. W. 2006. The "hite man '5 bu~den 117,], the We.'I'.' effi)n, to aid [he Fnt 
h",-e do"e so milch ill "lid so liltl" ",,,)d. Penguin. ~ew York. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
Ea;;wrly, W_ I 'N')_ I fie ghost orfinancmg gap: Te,tmg me grN' m model use,] in tile 
int~matiotl:ll financial in,limlions JOImw/ <:f Dcve/()(!mem Economic,< 00(2):423-
438. 
E..1>l~rly, W. 2007, Alnca"s po.en), tmp, Wall 511'£'('1 JUlln",/. ~3 March 21H17:A 11_ 
E..lskrly, W,. L,·vino:.", R. & RooJman, D , 2(1(14. Al<], policies. and growth: Comment_ 
The American Economic Review 94(3) :774-780, 
Edmllu,b, S.W. 1968. How dledive is foreign aid? Calijvl11;a Managemen/ Rn'iel1' 
11(1):13-~2 
Elbadawi, l.A. & HartLenocr!;, 1'.2000, Introdllction and OHrVl~W, In: Elbadawi. LA. 
& I laJvennerg. T_ (ed,_) f)evc/()l'meJ!i i.I.' I<e" in SOl<ih Africa. MacMi lIiun Press. 
Basimtoke, 
Efi 'on, F. & Sally, R. 2(106, Trode and aid: Countering new mi llennium colleClivi,m_ 
The A "slmlian r(.'(J'lomi(.' Review 39( I ):69-77_ 
Frank, A.G, I 966, Th~ un .. le"levelopm~nt ,'f developmeut MOlllhi,' Rede...- 1 ~(4): 1 7-
31. 
cmfiin, K, & Gurley, J. 1985, RHdJ<'al a'Mlyse> of im pe['~ll Lsm, the ThLrd W,,,ld, and 
the lramilion to "'--'Ciali,m: II 8urvey artide , JO!l,-"ai of F.conumi<· '--ilailiwe 
23(3):1089-1143. 
G"m~Jc, W,"-1. 2005, Thabo Jfbeki amllll<: balll"fur Ihe ;VIII vflhe AVe 7ebra, 
Capc To"n, 
G"pla, 5 .. Pc'well, R. & Yang, Y. 2006. MalTon-ollurnic challenges ujscali"g lip aid 
10 A/rica' A c/,eck/isl}Or practilwner", Imernation.,1 /o.{o .... ,(ar} Fum]. Waohing:l.on. 
D.L 
Hahib, A. & Pmlayacoc~, \/, 2000, RdullOU> Hl Soulh Arncu'" lnw,llion to deruocra~y. 
World iJevelopmelll 28( ~):24 5-263. 
Habib, A & Taylor, It. 1999, Smdh A1Ii~a: Anti-llpartlleid NGOs ltl Uan,ition, 
iI,lematiollal JOl!mal of f'ulimlary "ml l'':OI'profit (hganizaliuns 10( 1):73-82, 
Harley. A and Rule. P, 2003, F''I!ding. ell,ic" alld g/uba{;sal;oll: NGOs ill a SiHji;,'g 
('onlexl, R"lrie,,,,d on 15 July 2007 fwm URL 
www_cindi.''''' .. fa..'conrerence ' pa p"r~ 1-1'j r I ey _pdf 
H"rs~h. E. 2001 SOlllh Arri~" ta,'kles soci"llllequiti~", Some gaUR but"lill "long 
way 10 go in overcoming apurtheid';; k gacy _ A/rica l/een\'elY l4(4): I ~ -I 9_ 
Hart. G_ 200(;. POS1-apal'lh~id d~\'~l opment in his\O' ical at .. ] comparativ~ 1"""I",cli, e, 
In: Padayachee, V. (e,] ,) J)", f)evcioprnenl Decade? F.e'uilOmi(' ,,,,d So,-ial Clra"ge 
in S",'lh Aji-rca 1994 _ 21)()4. lIRe Pr~". Clpe Town, 
Hayter, T. I 971 Aid al fmper;ai;.w,_ Penguin, I larmond;;wortil, (;K_ 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Rdcrcn"~s 
Hc"m, 1.2000. Aiding democracy" lJonors mod civil ",~ iety in S[)uth Ani~~ l11iru 
W",-id (}uartcrly 21 (5)HI5-~,10 
Hjeltholm, r _, LauL,en. Land While, H. I !)()~_ ,\{acm'Yt!I!i"nic i.',<I«',' il/ .fi".,·ign lIid. 
Revised version of a pap" r prC$Ctltcd at a ~<!nfcJ'ct""C on Foreign aid and 
d~"dl'rmCnl: LC'''-'ll, of cxpnimcT and dinxlioll" [or loc fUlur~, C opcnhagl'll, 9-
10 Odober 1998. 
Hjntbolrn.l'. & ",'nile. H. 2000. f[)reign aid in hi.<jmical perspectiw: Background 
and [rend, In : Tarr. F. (ed.l Ft!rd,~n aid and dn'Ci"[lmcnl; (c.-.w",' '~f""f,cn'c"c" 
and dircctit!nlflir thcfulUrc, Rc,utJedge, J £>"d(l)" 
lioogeveen, J.G. & (filer, fl. 21105. No/ ,"para//', no/ <'ijl",1 Pvwrly "nd ;"c'I,wlily in 
fl(iSI-aparlheid 501<1/0 AJde". \\'OJ king p"p<:r no.73'1. William Da vidwll In,(iLU(l', 
r..lid>igan, 
Hoy, P. 1 '1'18. Plawr" (l1U/ is.m~s ill iiltcrn(lliollai aid. Kum",i~1l rr~", Connecticut. 
I shika" a, K. 19'1"1. Salioll buildillg "IU/ devcli'l'menl (~'Si.<t.lIICC in Ajdea diffcrcn/ by 
eq""I. -"'1"~"fil han Press. LomJon, LK. 
Jaya.,uriya. S.2006. Trade OJ' m,l; hy ,:;;;11", in Ihe dd"'l~. l'he Auslralian i::cmwmic 
Review 3'1(1);60-62, 
JJCA, 20Cl4. Ogat" asm~e5 Jibeki Japanese aid 10 Afi'ica. Retrie\'ed [)Il 15 September 
2007 Irom URL www.jIC".go.Jl..-.. ng1i<h.-r ... ;ou ... S.".·annOUlll·.~/2()04/nnv02.html. 
i(a"bllr. R.. Sand fer, T" & MOlTl:«m. K. I '1'1'1. The fumr!' of dcw/opmclII assi,Hance; 
"ommu" p(~,'s alld ,nlerna/i",,,,1 public -"o,ids. P[)licy Es.""v 25. 0, erseas 
DC\idopmmt Coun,'iL \\'",hinglon OC. 
K QPSlci n, F. n, 1 984. Thc "larshall Plan "rnl ;nJ lI,Iri,,1 JX,licy. Cl!a!lc",~c 27(2):55-5') 
K lot7. A. I 995, '-Jonns J'iXOnS hnlting mteJ'c>t" g:1()h"1 racial <Xlliahly ",xl U.S. 
<H"'-'1 ions Hgal ",I SOlith Aloc". IlIlernatiollal Orga"i~mioll 4'1(3):4 51 -47~ 
K r&'ly. A. & RaddHt l. C. 2007, I'o\i~,ly trap', "id, ",oJ growth. Journal of 
f)"wluf''''''iJI Fw"umi,~, 32(2):3 15-347, 
Krau«, \1 Ji. I 983 f)eve/upmenl w;lhOJ11 a,d gr"" Ih. povcrty, and govemmenl, 
McGraw-I 1III n ,>o1: Comp"ny. );Cv. York. 
Lens;nl:, R. & Whit ~, H. I W-!, fJ id dcp..'"d~"C<'. i."me., and indicators. A lm'l"i"l & 
W ikscl l intcrnalional, Shekholm. SW<xkn. 
Lope" C. I 9'-!,-!. A rc s.lru~nlral adJ IliHmcr:tt pmg:r"I11111~' an adeq u~t" rnJX'm~ t[) 
g loba l isation'! in/'Tna/iol1ll1 Sud,,' Science Jou,.",,1 5 I (102); 51 I-51 'I. 
Lo,-e, K 19'n Changing aid pattern, in S"uthem A j'['k;~ . f)ewlopmell/ i" Fmc/;,'c 
'l(3):2%-309. 
',7 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Refer~ncc, 
LUlL, J .\t, 1996. The soc iO-l'cl"l<Jmic restructuring ,,[ a pl"l-aparth~iJ South Arne". 
flllernalionil/./()umai 01 Soci,,! f;cmwrnic.< 23( 10 .... 11 )' I .17-1 4'), 
\lanuel, TA. 200-'. A[nca and the Wa,hltlgtotl Con,cn,m: fLtlding the right path. 
Filla/w" & n",dul'"u'II{ 40(3)' I S-211 
\Iamis, I L 200 1 Smal, A/ricil. limit' '0 change - Ih,· pu/jlicai ("'unum." (If 
Irw"fommlivII. S~Corl<:L Zed Books, r -D "oon. 
\lax-N~~L M.A. 199 1. [)cl'c!opment and hl~Tlan needs. In: :\1ax-~'ket M.A. (cd.) 
II"mal! scale development. The Ap<:_~ Pr~ss, New York. 
M~~w~lI, S, 2007. The Wash;nglo/! Consensus is dead! LOJlg live Ihe me/"-lIaJ'ratil~" 
Working Paper 243. O\,L't'leaS Development IImilute, Lot>..lon. LK. 
:\1ay, J. 21XJO. PO\wfy and iJlequality in Sowh A/i,ea: mcclill.~ the challcilf!.c_ D", id 
Philip, Cape Town . 
.\\cCawley, 1'. 2006. Aid ,ernlLS trade: some con,ideratiOlK l1,e Auslralian f:conomic 
Rc.'ie,," -,'J( 1 ): R9-')5 . 
.\\ in1:lllZa 20116 . IVa",."", i.< /'uid-Afrikll e,,11 parMer/mul p,m N<,der!"",i/ Re(ricnd 
on 7 December ~ln6 from LRL "\\"".minhu7a.nL 
-"1,'kal~, R. 2000. '\Ia.;w-~conomic context. I n: VIal', J. (ed.) I'(werty Wid i""'l'wlity i" 
South Aj'ricaJl." meerin? thc clwllcnge. David Philip, Capc Town 
-"1,'m"cy, 0. 2006. Aid ,'r trade, or aid a,\d trade'! !I.e Australian f:cOIwmic R<,d"w 
39( 1):n-RR. 
\1o<lcy, 1'. , Han'igan. J. & Toye, J 1991. Aid alld power. Ihe World Rank &polic'y-
hascd IClUli,,? Routledge, I .0 rHion_ I;K 
\1yrdal, G. 1989. The e4uality i"ue in world deyelopmcnt 71,,· Am<,rican Economi(' 
R",,;cw 79(6 l:g- I 7. 
Nab",kr~, D.\V. 200b. Dcvd"pml'nl th~Ol;e" knowledge production and 
~rnalnpawry practi-:e. In; l'adayachee, \' (cd. 1 The devc!()[!"!<,,,1 decade? 
EcoJlomic alld .",ciai cha,,?c in S()uth Ali'ica lYW _ ::V04. IISRC Prc", Cape 
Town. 
Nmci()(), K. 2006. Operati<malising South Africa's move from macroeconomic ,tabi li ty 
to microeconomic rcform. In: P.>dayachce. V. (cd.) 11", d~v.-!op"',""1 d<'('ade? 
I::con()mic and .w";,,/ cha"g!' in Sou/h A/rim 1994 - 20tJ4. HRC Pr~",. Cap" T,'wn. 
Ngd~za. B._ Chabane_ S., & Dbmmi, D. ~()In n,'vdop",,,nl co--ope,-"lio'1 '-'p{wl-
,""a/um;o" of ODA 10 the eduwlim, .<"c/o,. I nlcrnationa l Or2ani salion 
D~,elopmem, Ro<ebank 
OECD 2007a. Development Co-()perali()n Dirr:Clo,."le men-nAC). Retrieved on I 0 
July 2007a fwm URL www.o~cd .or-../d .. ~t 
68 
Un
ive
rs
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
RckrctlCCS 
OEen. ~()()7h, Gu!gmphil'l1! di.I'lri/,,"ion ()ffill/mei,,! (1(")'.",,' /() aid reei!," 11/,', !9(,I)-
:005. OrgaOlsalioto for Fconornic Cooperation arl<i Oc.dopmcnl, Bc<\timlshirc. 
UK 
nECD. ~()()7c. Sccwral dislri/mri<m /0 each d<~'c1()piJJg coumry, 19M-20115_ 
Organi.,ation for uOllomic C()()peration and Development, l:ledfordsllLre, LK. 
0,,1.'-'", F. ~O{)3 i'ragITLlti,m and tile gradual ,hirt from J~pellden~y to neoli l>eralism: 
the \,'or1<1 Ilank African leade" and dewlopmenl policy in Africa. W()rld 
nndop",,,,,' J I{ I 0): 1655-1672, 
Padayachcc, V. 1987. Apartheid South Africa arid the r nlcrnaliotla] Monetal" n",d. 
TmllSjim"arw" 3:31-57. 
I'adayachee, V. 200r,. IntnxiuClion In: l'adayache~, V. (~tI_) tnc de\'C!opmem decade? 
t:cOJ1()fI]ic and """iof chm,s:e in Soul" Ajri(-G IYW - 20()-I. ) IRe Press, Care Town 
Peel, R 20(IJ rheuII/lOiy IrillUy - Ihe IMF, fVH Ilnd WID. \,'il' Univer.,iry Pre", 
Jonanne,burg. 
Po)anyi, K. )944. "/1", "rea! 'rm"~f"rma(i()n. Farrar &. Rinehan, New York _ ,(Y. 
Pronk J P. 2004. Aid as a ~"t.alysL In: Pronk, J.P., !:lell, \1., I],oyce, 1.K .. Degnbnl-
Maninu"en, J., Dljkstra, AO., Edgren, G., Emmely, L, Hanlon. L lIouL W., 
Menmtr", S., Pelr"" .1., Singh, A., Slater, D" Sonlk1,tl, R. & Veltmeyer, 11. (ed,.) 
('ala/y.,i"" d"v!'/op"'enr.' A dd",te 0" aid. llIack\\cll Publi<hing, O~ford, UK 
Raffc'r, K. &. Singer, H.W 2(0). The economic Nonh-Soulh divide' Six decade, of 
IInequal deve lopment. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, LK. 
H,aplX)rt. N, &. Overing, J. 2000. Sodal alld cultural amhrnp()l()gy: 'the kev (,()IJUPI.<. 
Routledge, London"" New York. 
Riddell, R.C 2007. fJoe< foreign md rellily ",ork" Oxford I . ni\'er,ily Press, Oxford, 
ex, 
Rooul. l-U. 1996, PanicipalOry tkvcl()prnent- ajarg()n wncert? In: Coetzee, J K. &. 
GraaC 1. (l'll.<.) Recr>Jl.<tI1lCli()II, developm,,"t and pc"l'/'- Intemalional Tho"" on 
Pubhshing, Johanne ,burg. 
RO'l'nstein-Ht>tlan, P.N. I ')(, 1. Intemalional aid for underde\'eloped cOlIntri e,. Ih,· 
Ihview "fr.c,,",,"';c.,· and ShU;.'!;'-" 43(~) : 107- 1 38, 
Ro'to,,", W. W. ) ')53. The f'rrJN." of e"'!nomic grOIn". Oxford t: ni,'crs;ty Press, 
London, 
Roux, ,\'.L. 2005 . Unn:sl al th~ 10~,,1 :>plll're of gt"'~mlllem in South Afnca: 
unr'caljqic cxp<.;clallOn:> Of thl' inabilit) to nnpkmcm poliCIes'! :·;tratcgic Re\'Jewfor 
SOIll"em A/rica 27(2): 55-8 5. 
Sach<, J. 2(l()5h. n,e ""d ofpowr!y' ,','onomic possibilili" J .lin' "III' lime. P"ogum, 
London. 
69 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Reference, 
._._----------== 
Sachs. J. 2()()5a. {"vesting In dewlol'mew' A practical pia" 10 aehi<!ve til" .'vfillenl1;u", 
/)eve/v!,lfIe"t (;oat. Earth,can, L<mdon. 
S~ uvy, A. 19.~2, T 1'0;$ monde., une planete. f. '()hserva/cur I I~. 
Schn~; d",_ I I. & Gi lson, I" I ~99 . Small r"h in a hLg pond'! Extemal aid and the healt h 
'~cloT' in So"lh Africa, JJealih Policy alld Pla""IIIg l4{J) :264-272. 
Schn';:lic-r. PJ., Hook, S,W. & T~yl(>t. Fl , 19'98, Clarily;ng lhe torcign ~id punk: A 
comparison of American. hpalK'Sc" Fr~sch. al\d S"-cd;>ch aiJ flows, W'Hiti PlAllic," 
Sill ~):~94-323. 
Sogge, D. 2002. Gil"<' and taK'" what is the mailer with jim'("" aid? D,,,,iu Philip, 
Cape Town. 
Spa lding. " L 1 990. Rel~v"nce "fhmic rn"eci, for political mxi el'Onomil' 
JeYel"pment Studi". in Comparativr ftllNI1I11i,"'al /)evela!,,,,em 25(3 J:90-1 I 5. 
Stiglitz. J.E. 2(XI2 . (;loh"lisali"" and d,< dlSmlltrnl.'. Penguin Book;;. Lmxion. 
Sliglilz_ 1. E, 2004. fi,e Post Wa5hi"gton COiIS(·i!>U.' cons('!lSUS, Retrieveu (}n 24 April 
~(X)7 from U RL hilfl:/i"·".":~1':sb.colum bia.eJu/. 
Sumner, A. 2l!O6. In s~"n-,h ofihe I'(}sl- \V "sillngion I Lhs }consensus: lhe 'mIssing' 
content (}f I' RS I'S. a,ird World Quarteri" ~ 7(8): 141) 1-1412. 
Svensson, J. 2000, F(}n:lgn "iei and n:nt-seeking, Journal of fl!l~rnational ECOlwmiC5 
51:437-461. 
SweJish Foreign C;1imsiry 2007. Count!}" Strate!'!;y for Sl<edish Development 
C(}opaatirm with South Aji-ica. I July 2004 - 31 Deeelllher 21108. 
Regering,kan;;iJel UD, Slockholm 
Swilli ng, \1, & R lLsseiL ]1, ~OO~. file ., ;:ce am! scopc oj thc lIoJl-l""ofir sedor iJl South 
Afdea, (iraJ'!ale Sd.(>ol of I' ublic and Development \1anagemenl. L niYe"ity of 
lhe W itwaler;;ranJ & Cent,. of Civ il Society, Univer;;ity Clf l\at~ l , South Africa. 
Szum"" A, 2005. /1", dynaJJlics njsoc;o-ccmlomi" devc/opment: an iJ1lmdlldi"". 
Ca",hridge Universily I'reiS, Cam hridge. UK. 
T"y loT', M,F. 19'1 .. , Ethic-al consiJemliolli in Europe"n cros,-na tional re.earch. 
[,,/ernarlmw/ Social Science Juurnal 46(4): 523·532. 
rerrebla:oche, S, 2006. ,-, ilpossihie tn /!lake p"wrry hLft"ry iii SOllth Afi';"a? I' an, l 
Jiscu" ion "~1 aki ng poverty hi 'lory" at the Cape rown Rook Fair. Cape T 0""11. 
T ~"r'cblarx:h c, S, 2002. A h;slury o(iJJe(/IIalit.,· in South Afi';ea ! 6,\2 - 211<!2. Umversilv 
or N~wl PTCS". Pil'(c'mlaJiILb urg, 
Therien, J .. ]'. 2(X)2. D' hating fOl e ign ~ id : right VCl,U> 1cft. Third ;V",'I" Quarler(v 
2.1('1)449-4(,(,. 
70 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
neference, 
rhml-.eck~, E. Z(~~). 'I11~ ~\'olllljon of the d eve lop"'enl doctrim" and tha role of 
foreign aid, I 950- 201Xl. 1,,: Tarl', F _ led.) Foreign aid and develop"'''''' f. e,..,.o",. 
kUP"H"ri ""'/ directions Ior the i"(''''''' RO\Jllcllge, J ,onlloll. 
T",m"n. 11, S. J 949, Ina.ugural addno,s. Thur>day, Janua",' 20. I 949. fl1uug"ml 
"dd,-"",.".. 0/ (he pn-sid""ls of/he Un;led SI,,"'s fi-om George Washing/()" 1789 10 
GeM!:" Ew'I! 1989. US Gl"~mmcnl Pnming OHicc, Wasninglon. D,C. 
Cnilc><.1 Nalion, 2006. EcmJOmic development iJJ Africa -Doubli"g aid: Makin!!, the 
"Bi!!, l'ush" wmk U~CTAD/(j[)S/t\FRICA/20()(,/ Umtoo :\ation" Now York and 
Geneva_ 
Van lie Wiel.ll. 201)7, Tlulp help!. maar "011. "jet g~no~g. h!lema/iuIlal" 
Samen"', ',-killg(JutX:): I 2-1 ). 
Venter, M. I 994. In\l'olluction. J n: Venl",', M. (ell,) P,vspect jiH progre".- ('Filical 
choic(~'lor southern Aji-;"", "[ask~" :\1illcr Long,man, Capc T"wIL 
William,on. J. 2000, What ,h,,"lll l il~ W,'rld Bank think abolll the \Vashing'lo11 
Con,rn,"s? The World Railk Research Dlm"n"'1' 1 5(2):251-262, 
William,on. 5./1, 2007. Five wars IV cu",pute Ih(' relalh~' mille oja US Dollal' 
amollnl. 1790 - 2006, RdricHd on 12 SCPlcmbcJ' 2007 frnm URL 
WI, " ,m\,;!}uring'" "nh,c,'m. 
W mid Rank 2007h. II'".-id dewiupm(,111 indic(l),"" Rctricwd on 20 A\l !51l>1 2007b 
[rom URL "'WW wvrldbank,org, 
World Rank, 2007a. COIIC('pl ujil1jimnal S('(;WI', R~lric\'cd 01113 Scpkmkr 2007a 
from URL lnwch I 8, "''l'[ldb~nk, ,'rg:, 
Yoon. M.Y, 1997, Explaining C ,S, intcnrnliun in Third World ml~mal war." 1945-
I 9~9. The Joun1al oj C ",,{lid R (~'oiuliol! 4 I (4):580-602. 
L~y"tra, W.o. 1975. Aid Or dc\dopmem.- Ihe rd"vance ujd('veiopm(,l1t aid 10 
I"'ohielll.< of developing COlmlrie" Sijlhotf. Lcidrn. Th~ Ncthcrl~lllh. 
71 
Un
ve
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
FUOlnul¢< 
(A"l>t:r 200 I ; ~IH",r 1971, fil'adlou,,.' 199~, Chat",,';1~- J _ et al llI(Kl; "ILea" ley 1006: 
I'n" 2003; Kappilrl & O,erinll 2fl(Jf~ S"", Y 1952, S7;nna, 2(KIS: \ -an de Wid 
2t~J7: \\ ,1h;lUl~n 1(~ '~: V. "rid lI~nl.: , '!OO~a) 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
